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Professor Wang analyzes the close corporation provisions of the
recently enacted California General Corporation Law and points out
several troubling ambiguities. He discusses both the advantages and
the disadvantages of statutory close corporation status, placing spe-
dial emphasis on federal tax and California Securities Law problems
encountered by the statutory close corporation. In addition, the au-
thor makes a number of recommendations designed to eliminate im-
pediments to the use of the flexible devices newly created by the
corporations code.
* This article is based on, and expands, two speeches given by the author
before the Business Law Section of the San Diego County Bar Association (Feb.
16, 1977) and before the University of San Diego Law School Alumni Associa-
tion's Practical Legal Education of the Alumni (Jan. 29, 1977). An earlier version
of § IV(D) of this article (entitled California Securities Law Problems) was sent
to the Office of Policy of the California Department of Corporations in Febru-
ary, 1978, as comments on the Commissioner's Proposed Rules Changes relating
to the statutory close corporation. After the manuscript was in galleys, the
author received a copy of A.B. 2510 and the final set of securities rules relating
to close corporations (adopted May 12, 1978). These late developments neces-
sitated eleventh-hour changes in text and footnotes.
** Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law; member, State
Bar of California. B.A., Amherst College, 1967; J.D., Yale Law School, 1971. The
author would like to express his appreciation to his colleagues on the faculty of
the University of San Diego School of Law and to his wife, Kwan Wang, for their
valuable assistance in the editing of this article. The author would also like to
thank Mr. Clyde Greco (class of 1979) and Mr. Scott Dorius (class of 1979) for
their assistance in the research for several portions of this article.
Throughout this article, the following terminology will be used:
Close corporation-This term will be used only to describe California
statutory close corporations as defined in CAL. CORP. CODE § 158
(West Supp. 1976). A corporation with a small number of share-
holders will be called a closely held corporation.
Shareholders' agreement-This term will be used only to describe the
agreements defined in id. § 186 (written agreements among all of
the shareholders of a statutory close corporation). Quotation
marks will always be placed around the words "shareholders'
agreement" to emphasize that it is a term of art. Other contracts
or arrangements between shareholders will be called share-
holder contracts or shareholder arrangements.
Pooling agreement or voting agreement-These two terms will be used
synonymously to refer to a contract among shareholders that
their shares will be voted as a unit. Such an agreement may
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contain within it irrevocable proxies. Although the Corpora-
tions Commissioner and most commentators use the term vot-
ing agreement, I prefer the term pooling agreement because it
helps to distinguish this type of contract from other shareholder
arrangements such as voting trusts, in which the parties trans-
fer their shares to one or more trustees who vote the shares. See
generally Wang, Pooling Agreements Under the New Califor-
nia General Corpordtion Law, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1171 (1976).
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I. INTRODUCTION
On January 1, 1977, the new California General Corporation Law
became effective.' One of the most important goals of the new code is
new flexibility for the statutorily defined "close corporation." 2 There
appears, however, to be surprisingly little use of the new close corpo-
ration provisions by businesses. At my request, the Secretary of
State's office made a survey of 300 articles of incorporation filed in
mid-January, 1978. Only twenty-eight percent were close corpora-
tions.' The overwhelming majority of corporations are closely held;4
thus, it appears that many small businesses are not taking advan-
1. For a general discussion of the new law, see 1 H. BALLANTINE & G. STER-
LING, CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAWS (4th ed. 1977), reviewed by Siegel, Book
Review, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 914 (1977); 18 H. MARSH, CAUFORNIA CORPORATION
LAW AND PRACTICE (1977), reviewed by Siegel, supra; 1-2 NEW CALIFORNIA GEN-
ERAL CORPORATION LAW (P. Newman ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as NEW CAL.
GCL]; California's New General Corporation Law: A Symposium, 9 Loy.
L.A.L. REV. 733 (1976); California's New General Corporation Law, 7 PAC. L.J.
583 (1976); Symposium: The New California General Corporation Law, 23
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1035 (1976).
2. Throughout this article, the term "close corporation" will mean a § 158
corporation. Corporations with few shareholders will be called "closely held
corporations." See generally 18 H. MARSH, supra note 1, § 21.1.
3. Letter from Bill Holden, Staff Counsel, Office of the California Secretary
of State, to William K.S. Wang (Mar. 1, 1978) (on file with the San Diego Law
Review). In 1977, approximately 40,000 articles of incorporation were filed with
the Secretary of State. Id.
4. Professor Alfred Conard has estimated that over 90% of all corporations
have 10 or fewer shareholders. A. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 118
(1976); Conard, The Corporate Census: A Preliminary Exploration, 63 CALIF. L.
REV. 440,458-59 (1975). See also 1 H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, supra note 1, §
60.02[2][a]; M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF CORPORATIONS 38-39 (1976).
tage of the new provisions in the statute. Conversations with local
attorneys confirm that relatively few closely held corporations are
electing statutory close corporation status and that many companies
choosing such status are not making use of the devices made avail-
able by the new code. In part this may be due to inertia and lack of
familiarity with the new law, but it may also reflect ambiguity in the
statute, the limited advantages of close corporation status, and the
uncertainty about the impact of federal tax law and the California
Securities Law on the close corporation.
]1. THE CLOSE CORPORATION PROVISIONS OF THE
NEW GENERAL CORPORATION LAW
This section of the article will discuss the definition of "close
corporation," how a company voluntarily qualifies as a close corpo-
ration, and how a corporation might be voluntarily or involuntarily
disqualified as a close corporation. The next section will analyze the
benefits of close corporation status, with special emphasis on the new
close corporation pooling agreement and "shareholders' agree-
ment." 5
There is no single close corporation subchapter in the new code.
One whimsical explanation for this lack is that the "Big Business"
lobby was concerned that a separate section for close corporations
would appear to split the code into two sections-one covering big
business and one covering small business. The legislature might then
be tempted to tinker with the section regulating big business.
Another fanciful theory is that the close corporation provisions are
scattered throughout the code to make the law more confusing and
thereby generate legal fees for the experts associated with drafting
the law. Both hypotheses are dubious because section 158(g) contains
a list of all the sections making specific reference to the close corpo-
ration, and it is possible to create one's own close corporation sub-
chapter simply by reading all the provisions listed within this
section.
A. Definition of "Close Corporation"
Although the term close or closely held corporation may be defined
in various ways,6 a "close corporation" under the California Corpo-
5. Because "shareholders' agreement" is a term of art under § 186 of the new
Code, it will be placed in quotation marks throughout the article.
6. For example, in 1 F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE §
1.02 (2d ed. 1971), a closely held company is defined as "a corporation whose
shares are not generally traded in the securities markets." The term was judi-
cially defined in Brooks v. Willcuts, 78 F.2d 270,273 (8th Cir. 1935), as "a corpora-
tion in which the stock is held in few hands, or in few families, and wherein it is
not at all, or only rarely, dealt in by buying or selling." See generally 1 H.
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rations Code is defined in terms of specific, statutory requirements.
First, the name of the corporation must contain the word "corpora-
tion," "incorporated," "limited," or abbreviations for these words.
7
Second, the articles of incorporation must include the statement:
"This corporation is a close corporation."8 Third, the articles must
have a provision limiting the number of shareholders of record to a
specific number not to exceed ten.'
B. Qualification as Close Corporation
A company qualifies as a close corporation by voluntarily meeting
the three above-mentioned criteria. An existing corporation can elect
close corporation status by adding the essential word to its name (if
necessary) and the critical provisions to its articles, providing that
approval of all shares of all classes (voting or non-voting) is ob-
tained.10
C. Definition of "Shareholder"
As noted earlier, a close corporation is permitted a maximum of ten
shareholders of record. For the purpose of this limitation, a husband
and wife count as one shareholder. A corporation, partnership, or
trust also counts as a single shareholder unless it was specifically
formed for the purpose of evading the numerical limit."
BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, supra note 1, § 60.01; 1 F. O'NEAL, supra § 1.02-.04;
O'Neal & Magill, California's New Close Corporations Legislation, in 2 NEW
CAL. GCL, supra note 1, at 474, 480; W. PAINTER, CORPORATE AND TAX ASPECTS
OF CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS (1971); Adickes, A "Closed Corporation Law"
for California, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1990 (1966); McKenzie, Close Corporations in
California, in 1 NEW CAL. GCL, supra note 1, at 473; Note, Separate Statutory
Treatment of the Close Corporation in California: Progress and Problems, 27
HASTINGS L.J. 433 (1975).
7. CAL. CORP. CODE § 202(a) (West Supp. 1976); 1 H. BALLANTINE & G. STER-
LING, supra note 1, § 61.01l]; 18 H. MARSH, supra note 1, § 21.2, at 65-66.
8. CAL. CORP. CODE § 158(a) (West Supp. 1976).
9. Id. See also 1 H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, supra note 1, § 61.01[2][a]; 18
H. MARSH, supra note 1, § 21.2, at 66. The original proposal developed by the
Committee on Corporations of the State Bar of California and the Assembly
Select Committee on the Revision of the Corporation Code specified that a
corporation having no more than 35 shareholders could elect close corporation
status. See STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, COMMITTEE ON CORPORATIONS, EXPOSURE
DRAFT: GENERAL CORPORATION LAW § 159(a) (1974). See also 16 H. MARSH, supra
note 1, § 1.7, at 12.
10. CAL. CORP. CODE § 158(b) (West Supp. 1976); 1 H. BALLANTINE & G. STER-
LING, supra note 1, § 61.02, at 23-24. See generally ORGANIZING AND COUNSELING
CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS 53-54 (Cal. CEB 1977) [hereinafter cited as
ORGANIZING].
11. CAL. CORP. CODE § 158(d) (West Supp. 1976); 1 H. BALLANTINE & G. STER-
D. Termination of Close Corporation Status
Disqualification as a close corporation can be either voluntary or
involuntary. A corporation voluntarily terminates its close corpora-
tion status simply by amending its articles to delete the two required
provisions. If the articles are silent as to the required vote for termi-
nation of close corporation status, a two-thirds vote of each class of
stock is required.' 2 However, the articles may provide differently.
Thus any vote may suffice for disqualification, from a simple majori-
ty of each class to unanimous consent of each class. Furthermore, the
articles may deny a vote on the matter to any or all classes.' 3 As will
be discussed shortly, even greater flexibility as to the de facto re-
quired vote for termination is possible through the use of a pooling
agreement.
14
Close corporation status involuntarily terminates when some event
causes the company to have more than the maximum number of
shareholders specified in the articles.'" This change in the number of
shareholders might happen in several ways:
Death. One obvious possibility is that a deceased shareholder's
stock could be divided among a number of heirs.
16
Divorce. Because a husband and wife count as one shareholder,
an excessive number of shareholders may result if shares are split
between two divorced former spouses.
17
Dissolution of the slareholding entity. As mentioned earlier, for
purposes of the maximum shareholder limitation, a trust, partner-
ship, or corporation counts as one shareholder. Therefore, if a trust,
partnership, or corporation dissolves while holding shares in a close
corporation, the number of shareholders might exceed the max-
LING, supra note 1, § 61.01[2][b], at 4-21 to -22; 18 H. MARSH, supra note 1, § 21.2, at
66-67.
12. CAL. CORP. CODE § 158(c) (West Supp. 1976).
13. Id. §§ 152, 158(c), 204(a)(5). For a general discussion of voluntary termina-
tion, see 1 H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, supra note 1, § 64.01, at 110-11; 18 H.
MARSH, supra note 1, § 21.5, at 74-77.
14. See text accompanying notes 33-44 infra.See CAL. CORP. CODE § 158(a), (f)
(West Supp. 1976); 18 H. MARSH, supra note 1, § 21.5, at 74. For a discussion of
whether pooling agreement clauses can be inserted into a "shareholders' agree-
ment," see text accompanying notes 129-31 infra.
Close corporation status may also be voluntarily ended through a statutory
merger of the close corporation into a non-close corporation. Such a merger
must be approved by the same close corporation shareholder vote as an articles
amendment terminating close corporation status. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 1111,
1201(e) (West Supp. 1976). See 18 H. MARSH, supra note 1, § 21.5, at 74-75.
15. See 1 H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, supra note 1, § 64.02, at 111-13; 18 H.
MARSH, supra note 1, § 21.5, at 73-74.
16. CAL. CORP. CODE § 158(e) (West Supp. 1976); 1 H. BALLANTINE & G. STER-
LING, supra note 1, § 64.02[1], at 111; 18 H. MARSH, supra note 1, § 21.5, at 76.
17. CAL. CORP. CODE § 158(e) (West Supp. 1976); 1 H. BALLANTINE & G. STER-
LING, supra note 1, § 64.02[1], at 112; 18 H. MARSH, supra note 1, § 21.5, at 76.
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imum.'8 The corporation can protect against these contingencies by
imposing reasonable restraints on the transfer of stock 19 in the arti-
cles,20 in the by-laws,2 1 or in a contract 22 and by noting this fact on
the share certificate.23 Excess shareholders could also result if an
existing shareholder transferred his stock to several individuals. The
new code's special treatment of such transfers will be discussed
shortly.24
Once close corporation status has involuntarily terminated, the
board of directors is required to file an articles amendment deleting
the special provisions relating to close corporations and to "any other
provisions not permissible for a corporation which is not a close
corporation. '25 This amendment need not be approved by the share-
18. See text accompanying notes 9 & 11 supra.
19. On what constitutes a reasonable restraint on transfer, see generally Tu-
Vu Drive-In Corp. v. Ashkins, 61 Cal. 2d 283,391 P.2d 828,38 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1964)
(partially overruled by CAL. CORP. CODE § 204(b) (West Supp. 1976)); Bennett v.
Hibernia Bank, 47 Cal. 2d 540, 305 P.2d 20 (1956); Vannucci v. Pedrini, 217 Cal.
138, 17 P.2d 706 (1932); Corporate Securities Rule 260.140.8, 10 CAL. ADMN. CODE
§ 260.140.8 (1978); 1 H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, supra note 1, § 62.03[8][b]; 1A
H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, supra note 1, § 210[3]; BUSINESS BUY-OUT AGREE-
MENTS § 3.12 (Cal. CEB 1976) [hereinafter cited as BUY-OUT]; A FREY, J. CHOPER,
N. LEECH, & C. MoRRIs, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 523-40 (2d ed.
1977); ORGANIZING CORPORATIONS IN CALIFORNIA § 2.20 (Cal. CEB 1973); 18 H.
MARSH, supra note 1, §§ 21.18-.20; 2 F. O'NEAL, supra note 6, §§ 7.06-.12 (2d ed.
1971 & Supp. 1977); Berger, California's New General Corporation Law: Close
and Closely Held Corporations, 7 PAC. L.J. 585, 608-10 (1976); Bradley, A
Comparative Assessment of the California Close Corporation Provisions and a
Proposalfor Protecting Individual Participants, 9 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 865,889-90
(1976); Tennis, Management-Close Corporations, in 2 NEW CAL. GCL, supra
note 1, at 169, 177; Note, supra note 6, at 437-38, 453-63; Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 1272
(1973); Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d 1318 (1958); Annot., 65 A.L.R. 1159 (1930). See notes
148-61 and accompanying text infra.
Restraints on transfer frequently take the form of buy-sell agreements. See
generally 1 H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, supra § 63; BUY-OUT, supra §§ 3.1-.77;
A. GUILD, STOCK-PURCHASE AGREEMENTS AND THE CLOSE CORPORATION (2d ed.
1973); ORGANIZING CORPORATIONS IN CALIFORNIA § 2.20 (Cal. CEB 1973).
20. CAL. CORP. CODE § 204(b) (West Supp. 1976).
21. Id. § 212(b)(1).
22. 1A H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, supra note 1, § 210[4][c]; BUY-OUT,
supra note 19, § 1.9; FINANCING CALIFORNIA BUSINESSES § 4.6 (E. Giacomini ed.
1976); 18 H. MARSH, supra note 1, § 21.18, at 100; ORGANIZING CORPORATIONS IN
CALIFORNIA § 1.8 (Cal. CEB 1973). See text accompanying note 152 infra.
23. See CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 174, 418 (a), (b) (West Supp. 1976); CAL. CoM. CODE
§ 8204 (West 1964); BUY-OUT, supra note 19, § 1.9; FINANCING CALIFORNIA BUSI-
NESSES § 4.4 (Cal. CEB 1976). See CAL. COM. CODE § 8301 (West 1964).
24. See text accompanying notes 30-32 infra.
25. CAL. CORP. CODE § 158(e) (West Supp. 1976). See 1 H. BALLANTINE & G.
STERLING, supra note 1, § 64.02[2].
holders.26 Although the two special close corporation articles provi-
sions are obvious enough, 27 the statute does not expressly describe
any other articles provisions available only to a close corporation.2 8
Therefore, the reference to "other [impermissible] provisions" is
troubling, especially because the board alone can delete such "other"
provisions.
2 9
H. BENEFITS OF CLOSE CORPORATION STATUS
Thus far, this article has discussed the statutory definition of a
close corporation and how a company becomes qualified and dis-
qualified from close corporation status. At this point, the reader is
probably wondering about the benefits of close corporation status..
Actually, the advantages are few. Some devices that were already
permitted by the common law and other devices whose legality was
questionable are now expressly approved for close corporations. In
addition, close corporations are permitted to waive all the procedural
formalities imposed by the General Corporation Law. These various
advantages of close corporation status will be discussed in order of
increasing importance.
A. Restraints on Voluntary Inter Vivos Transfers
Technically, the new law has a requirement that each share certifi-
cate of a close corporation contain a legend stating that the number
of shareholders of record cannot exceed the specific number set in
the articles.30 If the shares contain this legend, the statute voids any
voluntary inter vivos transfer which would result in the number of
shareholders exceeding that set within the articles. 31 Absent such a
26. See authorities cited note 25 supra.
27. See text accompanying notes 8-9 supra.
28. See 1 H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, supra note 1, § 63.01. Cf. Jordan,
The Close Corporation Provisions of the New California General Corporation
Law, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1094, 1158-60 (1976) (discussing a number of statutory
provisions which might be useful for both close and closely held corporations).
29. CAL. CORP. CODE § 158(e) (West Supp. 1976).
30. Id. § 418(c); 1 H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, supra note 1, § 61.04, at 29; 18
H. MARSH, supra note 1, § 21.3, at 67-68.
31. CAL. CORP. CODE § 418(d) (West Supp. 1976). Thus, the statute appears to
impose an absolute restraint on transfers which would result in the maximum
shareholder limitation being exceeded. Actually, the Code is not quite this strict,
If the close corporation fails to place the legend on the certificates, close corpo-
ration status is apparently not lost. 1 H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, supra note
1, § 64.02[1l]. But cf. Jordan, supra note 28, at 1109-10 (suggesting that a court
might hold that qualification as a close corporation is conditional on use of the
legend). In any event, without the legend, close corporation status can be ter-
minated through a voluntary inter vivos transfer. 1 H. BALLANTINE & G. STER-
LING, supra § 64.02[2].
Section 418(d) does not refer to the knowledge of the transferee of close
corporation shares. If a transferee of close corporation shares knew about the
restrictions on transfer, but there were no legend on the shares, one commen-
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statutory provision, the courts would probably not permit such an
absolute restraint on transfer. As Professor O'Neal has noted, "[f]rom
the early cases to the present time, absolute restrictions unlimited in
time on the alienability of shares (whether in the articles, in the
bylaws, or in shareholders' agreements) have almost without excep-
tion been held invalid.
32
B. Close Corporation Pooling Agreements
A pooling agreement (or voting agreement) is a contract among
shareholders providing that their shares will be voted as a unit. The
contract specifies either how the shares will be voted or the proce-
dures for determining how they are to be voted.33 The new law
expressly validates pooling agreements among -shareholders of close
corporations and makes these pooling agreements specifically en-
forceable.
34
The new law also explicitly permits close corporation pooling
agreements to be made self-executing through irrevocable proxies.
35
In light of the delay and the inconvenience involved in obtaining a
tator has argued that the transfer would be void despite the silence of the statute
on this issue. Jordan, supra at 1109 n.30. But see 1 H. BALLANTINE & G. STER-
LING, supra § 64.02[2], at 4-112 n.1O (Even if "a transferee had actual notice....
[i]t would not appear unreasonable, in view of the simplicity of complying with
the legend requirements, to require strict conformity therewith if purported
transfers are to be void.").
In any case, if the proper legend is placed on all share certificates of a close
corporation, the statute voids any voluntary inter vivos transfer which would
cause the number of shareholders to exceed the maximum specified in the
articles.
32. 2 F. O'NEAL, supra note 6, § 7.06, at 7-18 (parenthetical original). See also
1A H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, supra note 1, § 21013[a]; Note, supra note 6, at
454-55; Comment, Corporations-Articles of Incorporation-Restriction on
Transfer of Stock, 18 IowA L. REV. 88 (1932); Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d 1318, 1322
(1958); Annot., 65 A.L.R. 1159, 1165 (1930). Cf. Berger, supra note 19, at 609
(discussing a few non-California cases upholding absolute transfer prohibitions
imposed for a specifically limited time period of short duration). See generally
18 H. MARSH, supra note 1, § 21.18.
33. See 1 H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, supra note 1, § 62.042][b], at 4-60;
Wang, supra note **, at 1171 & n.1. This article will use the terms "pooling
agreement" and "voting agreement" synonymously.
34. CAL. CORP. CODE § 706(a) (West Supp. 1976); 1 H. BALLANTINE & G. STER-
LING, supra note 1, § 62.04[2][b]; 18 H. MARSH, supra note 1, § 21.11, at 88; Bradley,
supra note 19, at 874-76; O'Neal & Magill, California's New Close Corporation
Legislation, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1155, 1162 (1976); Wang, supra note **, at 1174-
75.
35. The new Code provides that a proxy is irrevocable, if itso states, when it is
held by a person designated by or under a close corporation pooling agreement.
CAL. CoRP. CODE § 705(e)(5) (West Supp. 1976); Bradley, supra note 19, at 875;
Jordan, supra note 28, at 1128-29; Wang, supra note **, at 1181.
judicial decree of specific performance, such irrevocable proxies are
an especially valuable means of enforcing pooling agreements.3 6
If a third party is designated as proxy-holder of all the shares
subject to a pooling agreement, the arrangement resembles a voting
trust.37 Indicative of the new code's solicitousness toward close
corporation pooling agreements is a statutory provision 38 which pro-
vides that a close corporation pooling agreement shall not be invalid
on the basis that it is a voting trust which fails to comply with the
requirements imposed on voting trusts.
39
In order for a close corporation pooling agreement (or any irrevo-
cable proxy) to be binding on transferees, the existence of the agree-
ment and/or proxy must be noted on the share certificate. 40 There is
no statutory requirement that pooling agreements be among all the
shareholders of the close corporation; 41 nor is there a statutory limit
on the duration of the pooling agreement. 42 A pooling agreement
36. 18 H. MARSH, supra note 1, § 21.11, at 93-94; Wang, supra note *", at 1175-76;
Comment, The Enforcement of Shareholder Voting Pool Agreements: A Pro-
posed Amendment to the Louisiana Business Corporation Law, 6 Loy. L. REV.
59, 65 (1951). See also Bradley, supra note 19, at 875-76.
37. See 1 H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, supra note 1, § 62.04[2][c], at 4-63;
Bradley, Toward a More Perfect Close Corporation-The Need for More and
Improved Legislation, 54 GEO. L.J. 1145, 1169-72 (1966); O'Neal & Magill, supra
note 34, at 1163; Wang, supra note **, at 1177.
The voting trust has been defined as:
[a trust] created by an agreement between a group of the stockholders
of a corporation and the trustee, or by a group of identical agreements
between individual stockholders and a common trustee, whereby it is
provided that for a term of years, or for a period contingent upon a
certain event, or until the agreement is terminated, control over the
stock owned by such stockholders, either for certain purposes or for all,
shall be lodged in the trustee, either with or without a reservation to the
owners or persons designated by them of the power to direct how such
control shall be used.
5 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2075, at 330-
31 (rev. ed. 1976). See generally 1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 6, § 5.31; W. PAINTER,
CORPORATE AND TAX ASPECTS OF CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS § 3.2 (1971);
Baldwin, Voting-Trusts, 1 YALE L.J. 1 (1891); Burke, Voting Trusts Currently
Observed, 24 MINN. L. REV. 347 (1940); Gose, Legal Characteristics and Conse-
quences of Voting Trusts, 20 WASH. L. REV. 129 (1945); Note, The Voting Trust:
California Erects a Barrier to a Rational Law of Corporate Control, 18 STAN.
L. REV. 1210 (1966); Annot., 98 A.L.R.2d 376 (1964).
38. CAL. CORP. CODE § 706(c) (West Supp. 1976).
39. Under § 706(b), voting trusts must be renewed every 10 years, and a
duplicate of the voting trust agreement must be filed with the secretary of the
corporation and made available for inspection. Id. § 706(b). See 1 H. BALLANTINE
& G. STERLING, supra note 1, § 62.04[c]; 1A H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, supra
note 1, § 174.02[1]; 18 H. MARSH, supra note 1, § 21.11, at 88-89; 17 H. MARSH, supra
note 1, §§ 11.33-.36, at 81-86.
40. CAL. CORP. CODE § 418(a)(3), (b) (West Supp. 1976).
41. 1 H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, supra note 1, § 62.04[2][a], at 4-59. See
CAL. CORP. CODE § 706(a) (West Supp. 1976).
42. REPORT OF THE ASSEMBLY SELECT COMIITTEE ON THE REVISION OF THE
CORPORATIONS CODE 86 (1975); reprinted in 18 H. MARSH, supra note 1, app. A at
312; 1 H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, supra note 1, § 62.04[2](b], at 4-60; 18 H.
MARSH, supra § 21.11, at 89. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 706(a) (West Supp. 1976).
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among close corporation shareholders terminates when close corpo-
ration status terminates, 43 except that, if the agreement so provides,
it continues after the termination of close corporation status, to the
extent it is enforceable apart from the statute.
44
C. Non-Close Corporation Pooling Agreements
As just stated, the Corporations Code expressly provides that a
pooling agreement may continue even after the termination of close
corporation status "to the extent it is enforceable apart from [the
statute]. ' '45 This language raises the question whether pooling agree-
ments among non-close corporation shareholders are valid. If they
are valid, one apparent advantage of close corporation status disap-
pears. The new code does not provide a specific answer to this ques-
tion but merely states that the statutory provision on close corpora-
tion pooling agreements does not invalidate any other agreement
among shareholders not otherwise illegal. 46 The Assembly Select
Committee report explained that this language "is intended to pre-
serve any agreements which would be upheld under court decisions
even though they do not comply with one or more of the requirements
of this section [706], including voting agreements of corporations
other than close corporations."41
Although most jurisdictions have legitimized pooling agree-
ments, 48 there appears to be only one decision dealing with the valid-
ity of pooling agreements in California,49 Smith v. San Francisco &
North Pacific Railway.50 In 1893, three individuals (Smith, Foster,
43. CAL. CORP. CODE § 706(a) (West Supp. 1976).
44. Id. See also Wang, supra note **, at 1189.
45. CAL. CORP. CODE § 706(a) (West Supp. 1976).
46. Id. § 706(d); Wang, supra note **, at 1174-75. Section 706(d) provides that §
706 "shall not invalidate any voting or other agreement among shareholders or
any irrevocable proxy ... which agreement or proxy is not otherwise illegal."
47. REPORT OF THE ASSEMBLY SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE REVISION OF THE
CORPORATIONS CODE 87-88 (1975), reprinted in 18 H. MARSH, supra note 1, app. A
at 312. See 1 H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, supra note 1, § 62.04[2[b], at 4-62. The
Assembly Select Committee drafted the new General Corporation Law, and the
report accompanied the proposed bill sent to the legislature.
48. 6A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 522 (1962); H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 267 (1970); W.
PAINTER, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS IN BUSINESS PLANNING 27 (1975). See 5 W.
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2064 (rev. ed.
1976); 1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 6, §§ 5.04-.12; RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 569,
Illustration 3 (1932); Bradley, supra note 19, at 879; Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 799
(1956).
49. See 18 H. MARSH, supra note 1, § 21.11, at 90-92. See also Jordan, supra
note 28, at 1127-28; Wang, supra note **, at 1174 n.8, 1183 n.18.
50. 115 Cal. 584, 47 P. 582 (1897).
and Markham) mutually agreed to bid for a 42,000 share block of a
railroad corporation and upon acquiring the stock to execute a
contract whereby the whole block would for five years be voted as a
unit. After their bid was accepted, the three entered into a written
agreement which provided:
[Sbo as to keep the control of the corporation from passing to persons
other than themselves .... [it is] mutually agreed between said Fos-
ter, Markham, and Smith that they will, during said period [five
years], retain the power to vote said shares in one body, and that the
vote which shall be cast by said shares, whether for directors or for
any other purpose, shall be determined by ballot between them or
their survivors.
5 1
The stock was split up and held in the names of the three parties
individually. 2 In 1896, after Foster and Markham had decided by
ballot to vote all the stock for certain directorial candidates, Smith
attempted to vote his own shares at the annual meeting in breach of
the contract. When Foster objected, the officer presiding over the
meeting allowed Foster and Markham to vote Smith's shares in
compliance with the pooling agreement.5 3 The California Supreme
Court upheld the presiding officer and ruled that the pooling agree-
ment was valid and enforceable. Furthermore, the court held that the
contract effectively created contingent, irrevocable proxies for the
majority to vote the entire block of stock.54 On the matter of public
policy, the opinion was sweeping:
"If there is one thing which more than another public policy requires,
it is that men of full age and competent understanding shall have the
utmost liberty of contracting, and that their contracts, when entered
into freely and voluntarily, shall be held sacred, and shall be enforced
by courts of justice." It is not in violation of any rule or principle of
law for stockholders, who own a majority of the stock in a corpora-
tion, to cause its affairs to be managed in such way as they may think
best calculated to further the ends of the corporation, and, for this
purpose, to appoint one or more proxies who shall vote in such a way
as will carry out their plan. Nor is it against public policy for two or
more stockholders to agree upon a course of corporate action, or upon
the officers whom they will elect, and they may do this either by
themselves, or through their proxies, or they may unite in the appoint-
ment of a single proxy to effect their purpose .... Whether such an
agreement is illegal, so that any action or vote under it can be set aside,
or is of such a character that it will not be enforced, will depend upon
51. Id. at 596, 47 P. at 586.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 597, 47 P. at 586-87. See N. LATTIN, R. JENNINGS, & R. BUXBAUM,
CORPORATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 304 (4th ed. 1968). At the time of the
meeting, the North Pacific Railway Company had a total of 18 shareholders,
Brief for Appellee at 39, Smith v. San Francisco & N. Pac. Ry., 115 Cal. 584,47 P.
582 (1897).
54. 115 Cal. at 600-08,47 P. at 587-91. The proxies were contingent on a breach
of the contract by one party. For a conceptual discussion of "contingent" irrevo-
cable proxies, see Wang, supra note **, at 1176-77.
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the object with which it is made, or the acts that are done under it, and
will be governed by other rules of law.
55
On the basis of the California Supreme Court decision in Smith,
some commentators, including myself,5 6 have concluded that pooling
agreements are valid in California. 7 However, in light of the paucity
of case law, other authorities have concluded that the validity of non-
close corporation pooling agreements is in doubt. 8
55. 115 Cal. at 600-02, 47 P. at 588 (emphasis added) (quoting Printing &
Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson, L.R. 19 Eq. 462, 465 (M.R. 1875)).
56. Wang, supra note **, at 1174, 1188.
57. For example, William Schwarzer has stated: "Since the decision in Smith
v. S.F. & N.P. Ry. Co. . . . , there has been no doubt of the validity of such
agreements." Schwarzer, Practical Problems of Organizing Closely Held
Corporations, in ADvIsING CALIFORNIA BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 403, 408 (Cal.
CEB 1958). In addition, Professor Edwin J. Bradley, an expert on closely
held corporations, has commented: "[Alt common law shareholder agreements
were usually sustained. If [in California] the close corporation shareholders
plainly agree that upon terminatiQn of close corporation status a backstop
shareholder voting agreement is to become operative, the chances are good that
it will be a valid agreement." Bradley, supra note 19, at 879.
Despite these comments about the general validity of pooling agreements,
Professor Bradley feels that, because of the demanding fiduciary duty which
close corporation associates owe each other, legislatures should invalidate pool-
ing agreements that are not entered into by all the shareholders of a closely held
corporation. Thus, he criticizes even § 706(a) as too permissive. Id. at 876-78. See
also Bradley, Toward a More Perfect Close Corporation-The Need for More
and Improved Legislation, 54 GEO. L.J. 1145, 1173-75 (1966); Wang, supra note
**, at 1188 n.81.
58. 1 H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, supra note 1, § 62.04[1[b], at 4-62;
Berger, supra note 19, at 599-600. See Siegel, Book Review, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
914, 920 (1977). One commentator has even argued that despite § 706(d), § 706(a)
may invalidate non-close corporation pooling agreements. Jordan, supra note
28, at 1131-36. This conclusion was in part based on the language of § 706(a) prior
to the addition of the last clause permitting a close corporation pooling agree-
ment to continue "to the extent it is enforceable apart from this subdivision."
See Wang, supra note **, at 1189.
Professor Siegel criticizes the California statute for not eliminating this
uncertainty. Siegel, supra at 920 (1977). For a specific proposal to give statutory
sanction to all pooling agreements, see Wang, supra at 1187-88.
At my suggestion, on March 7, 1978, the Legislation Committee of the San
Diego County Bar Association recommended that the Board of Governors of
the State Bar of California sponsor legislation to amend § 706(a) in precisely the
manner urged in my previous article. Letter from John C. Stiska, Esq., to
William K. S. Wang (Mar. 8, 1978) (on file with the San Diego Law Review);
Resolution Proposed by the San Diego County Bar Association (Mar. 7, 1978)
(on file with the San Diego Law Review). My 1976 article also suggested that "it
might be appropriate to place the same ten year statutory maximum on both
[pooling agreements and voting trusts]." Wang, supra at 1188 (emphasis added)
(citations omitted). The Legislation Committee adopted the ingenious compro-
mise of proposing a 10-year statutory maximum on the duration of irrevocable
proxies in pooling agreements. After the 10-year period, the parties would be
forced to request specific performance from a court, which, for equitable rea-
Therefore, shareholders of non-close corporations who wish to
avoid uncertainty should use a voting trust to reallocate voting pow-
er.5 9 The new law allows the shareholders of any corporation,
whether close or non-close, to create a voting trust.6 Unlike pooling
agreements, a voting trust is subject to a statutory maximum dura-
tion of ten years; it can, however, be extended for successive ten-year
periods. 61 To be valid, a duplicate of the voting trust agreement must
be filed with the secretary of the corporation and made available for
inspection.6 2 Unfortunately, voting trust certificates are securities
under both California 63 and federal law;64 voting trust interests are
also securities under California law65 and conceivably under federal
statute.66 Although a voting trust obviously involves more complica-
tions than a pooling agreement, it is the only absolutely safe non-
close corporation voting arrangement (other than separate classes of
stock).
sons, might refuse to enforce the pooling agreement. See Resolution Proposed
by the San Diego County Bar Association supra.
59. See Berger, supra note 19, at 595-96. For a definition of "voting trust," see
note 37 supra.
60. CAL. CORP. CODE § 706(b) (West Supp. 1976). This section reads in pertinent
part:
Shares in any corporation may be transferred by written agree-
ment to trustees in order to confer upon them the right to vote and
otherwise represent the shares for such period of time, not exceeding 10
years, as may be specified in the agreement. The validity of a voting
trust agreement, otherwise lawful, shall not be affected during a period
of 10 years from the date when it was created or last extended as
hereinafter provided by the fact that under its terms it will or may last
beyond such 10-year period. At any time within two years prior to thetime of expiration of any voting trust agreement as originally fixed or as
last extended as provided in this subdivision, one or more beneficiaries
under the voting trust agreement may, by written agreement and with
the written consent of the voting trustee or trustees, extend the duration
of the voting trust agreement with respect to their shares for an addi-
tional period not exceeding 10 years from the expiration date of the trust
as originally fixed or as last extended as provided in this subdivision.
Id. (emphasis added). See generally 1A H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, supra
note 1, § 174.02; 17 H. MARSH, supra note 1, §§ 11.33, .34, .36; Bradley, supra note
19, at 875.
61. See note 60 supra.
62. Id.
63. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25019 (West Supp. 1976); 1 H. MARSH & R. VOLK,
PRACTICE UNDER THE CALIFORNIA SECURITIES LAW § 5.16 (rev. ed. 1977). See also 2
H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, supra note 1, § 455.04; 17 H. MARSH, supra note 1,
§ 11.33, at 83-84. Section 25102(f) exempts from qualification any offer or sale of
a voting trust interest if, after the "sale," the interests are held by no more than
five individuals. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(f) (West Supp. 1976).
64. Securities Act of 1933, § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(1) (1970); Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(a)(10) (1970); 3 H. BLOOMENTHAL,
SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 2.23 (1977); Diczok, Recent Cases, 3
SEC. REG. L.J. 183, 190 (1975). See also 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 460 &
n.18 (1961). See generally Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Provident Life Ins. Co., 499
F.2d 715 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1107 (1975).
65. See authorities cited note 63 supra.
66. See generally authorities cited note 64 supra.
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Assuming non-close corporation pooling agreements are valid, the
question arises whether they can be made self-executing through
irrevocable proxies . 6 The new law provides that a proxy is irrevoca-
ble if it so states and "if it is given to secure the performance of a
duty."6 8 The last phrase is taken verbatim from the Restatement
(Second) of Agency's definition of "power given as security.' 69 This
concept is intended to cover those pseudo-agency powers which,
because they are granted for the protection of someone other than the
power-grantor, cannot be revoked like normal agency powers. 1 An
irrevocable proxy in a pooling agreement is utilized to secure the
performance of each party's duty to comply with the contract. It is
created for the benefit not of the grantor but of the other parties. It
seems clear that such a proxy would be an irrevocable "power given
as security."
7 1
Nevertheless, because section 705(e)(5) expressly allows close
corporation pooling agreements to utilize irrevocable proxies,72 some
commentators have suggested that its language may prevent the use
of irrevocable proxies in pooling agreements not created under sec-
67. See text accompanying notes 35-36 supra.
The pooling agreement clause creating the proxies might be drafted as
follows:
Irrevocable Proxies. Furthermore, if at any time, any party(ies) to
this agreement refuse to comply with the agreement, the complying
party(ies) shall have the irrevocable power to vote the noncomplying
party's(ies') shares in compliance with the agreement. This power to
vote the noncomplying party's(ies') shares shall constitute an irrevoca-
ble power (1) coupled with an interest, (2) given as security, and (3) given
to secure the performance of a duty, as the term is used in section 705(e)
of the California General Corporation Law.
For an example of a pooling agreement form with an irrevocable proxy, see 2
CALIFORNIA LEGAL FORMS, form 8.71, at 8-189 to -192 (M. Bender 1977) [hereinaf-
ter cited as FORMS].
68. CAL. CORP. CODE § 705(e) (West Supp. 1976); Wang, supra note **, at 1181.
69. 17 H. MARSH, supra note 1, § 11.29, at 76-77; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 138 (1957); Wang, supra note **, at 1181-82.
70. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 138, Comments a-d (1957); Wang,
supra note **, at 1180-81 and authorities cited therein. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF AGENCY § 139, Comments a-d (1957) (explaining the circumstances under
which a power given as security is not terminated).
71. Bradley, Toward a More Perfect Close Corporation-The Need for More
and Improved Legislation, 54 GEo. L.J. 1145, 1165 (1966); Wang, supra note *,
1181-84. See 1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 6, § 5.36, at 127.
72. Actually, § 705(e)(5) does not refer to just § 706(a) agreements but to "[a]
person designated by or under an agreement under Section 706." CAL. CORP.
CODE § 705(e)(5) (West Supp. 1976). The reason for the broader reference is not
clear. See Wang, supra note **, at 1182 n.54. Cf. Jordan, supra note 28, at 1131
n.87 (arguing that § 705(e)(5)'s reference includes at most subdivisions (a) and (b)
of § 706 and cannot include subdivision (d)).
tion 706(a)."3 This argument is unpersuasive. The last sentence of
section 705(e) clearly states: "In addition to the foregoing clauses (1)
through (5), a proxy may be made irrevocable. . . if it is given to
secure the performance of a duty. . . . 14 Furthermore, the issue of
irrevocable proxies in non-close corporation pooling agreements on-
ly arises if such agreements are valid. If such contracts are not
contrary to public policy, there seems to be no compelling reason to
prevent the parties from making them self-executing.
75
Assuming a non-close corporation pooling agreement is valid, the
multi-purpose section 706(d)7 6 would also appear to eliminate any
danger that the device would be held invalid because it fails to
comply with the formalities imposed on a voting trust by section
706(b). The language of section 706(d) is virtually identical to section
218(e) of the Delaware General Corporation Law, which is listed as
the source of section 706(d) in the Assembly Select Committee re-
port. 7 The language of section 218(e) has generally been regarded as
a legislative reversal 78 of Abercrombie v. Davies,79 a Delaware deci-
sion which held a pooling agreement with irrevocable proxies to be a
voting trust and invalidated the entire arrangement because the
parties had not complied with the statutory requirements for voting
trusts. Therefore, section 706(d) presumably protects all pooling
agreements from being invalidated because of their similarity to
voting trusts.8"
73. 18 H. MARSH, supra note 1, § 21.11, at 94; Jordan, supra note 28, at 1131.
74. CAL. CORP. CODE § 705(e)(5) (West Supp. 1976) (emphasis added). See
authorities cited note 35 supra.
75. But cf. note 58 supra (discussing the San Diego County Bar Association
Legislation Committee's proposal to impose a 10-year limit on irrevocable prox-
ies in pooling agreements. After the 10-year period, the parties would have to
seek specific performance, which might be denied for equitable reasons.).
76. See note 46 supra.
77. REPORT OF THE ASSEMBLY SELECT COMITTEE ON THE REvIsION OF THE
CORPORATIONS CODE 87 (1975), reprinted in 18 H. MARSH, supra note 1, app. A, at
312.
78. E. FOLK, REVIEW OF THE DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW 27 (1968); 1 F.
O'NEAL, supra note 6, § 5.33; W. PAINTER, CORPORATE AND TAX ASPECTS OF
CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS 104, 446 (1971); Jordan, supra note 28, at 1133;
Comment, Shareholder Pooling Agreements-Validity, Legality and Enforce-
ment, 24 ARK. L. REV. 501,512 (1971). Professor Folk was one of the draftsmen of
DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 218(e) (1975). W. PAINTER, supra at 446.
79. 35 Del. Ch. 599, 123 A.2d 893 (1956), rev'd on other grounds, 36 Del. Ch. 371,
130 A.2d 338 (1957).
80. Wang, supra note **, at 1178. The presence of § 706(d) is another indication
that non-close corporation pooling agreements are not contrary to public policy.
Section 706(c) already eliminates the Abercrombie problem for close corpora-
tion pooling agreements. Therefore, to the extent that § 706(d) is addressed to the
Abercrombie problem, it indicates legislative solicitousness for non-close corpo-
ration pooling agreements. But see Jordan, supra note 28, at 1133-34.
A pooling agreement which is too similar to a voting trust might run afoul of
either the California Securities Law, which considers certificates or interests in
voting trusts as securities, or federal securities law, which includes voting trust
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Summary
In conclusion, the pooling agreement device may be available to
both close and non-close corporation shareholders, but an advantage
of close corporation status is the express statutory sanction for
shareholder pooling agreements.
D. "Shareholders' Agreements"
The most advantageous device available to close corporation
shareholders is the "shareholders' agreement," a term of art under
the new code.8 Such an agreement can only be entered into by
shareholders of a close corporation, must be in writing, and (unlike
voting trusts and pooling agreements) 82 must be executed by all the
shareholders.83 A transferee of shares subject to such an agreement is
bound by its provisions if two conditions are met: (1) The agreement
is filed for inspection with the secretary of the company, and (2) the
transferee has actual notice of the agreement, or the existence of the
agreement is noted on the stock certificate. 84 A "shareholders' agree-
ment" among close corporation shareholders terminates when close
corporation status ends, except that if the agreement so provides, it
continues to the extent otherwise enforceable.
85
The permissible subject matter of a "shareholders' agreement" is
not expressly described in the statute, which simply states in perti-
nent part:
[N]o shareholders' agreement, which relates to any phase of the af-
fairs of a close corporation, including but not limited to management
of its business, division of its profits or distribution of its assets on
liquidation, shall be invalid as between the parties thereto on the
ground that it so relates to the conduct of the affairs of the corporation
as to interfere with the discretion of the board or that it is an attempt
to treat the corporation as if it were a partnership or to arrange their
relationships in a manner that would be appropriate only between
partners.
88
certificates (and conceivably voting trust interests) in the definition of security.
See note 63 & authorities cited note 64 supra.
81. CAL. CORP. CODE § 186 (West Supp. 1976). "'Shareholders' agreement'
means a written agreement among all of the shareholders of a close corpora-
tion, or if a close corporation has only one shareholder between such sharehold-
er and the corporation, as authorized by subdivision (b) of Section 300." Id.
(emphasis added). See generally O'Neal & Magill, supra note 34, at 1160-63.
82. See text accompanying notes 33-34 supra. See also note 37 and accom-
panying text supra.
83. See authorities cited note 81 supra.
84. CAL. CORP. CODE § 300(b) (West Supp. 1976).
85. Id.
86. Id.
The provision is phrased in the negative. It does not provide that
certain kinds of clauses in "shareholders' agreements" are absolutely
valid but only that all clauses (of any kind) are not invalid because of
interference with board discretion or because the shareholders seem
to be treating the corporation as a partnership. The statute does not
make clear when a clause in a "shareholders' agreement" would be
invalid for some other unspecified reason. 87 In other words, the stat-
ute says: "No 'shareholders' agreement' shall be invalid because of A,
B, or C." It does not prevent a judge from invalidating an agreement
because of D, E, F, or any other reason.
The above provision, section 300(b), is based on a provision of the
North Carolina close corporation statute88 which is also phrased in
the negative. The principal draftsman of the North Carolina provi-
sions, Professor Latty, acknowledges that "the basic approach is: no
[written] arrangement agreed to by all the co-owners. . . is invalid
just because it is a partner-like arrangement. A court may pronounce
it bad for other reasons, although presumably it would have to be
something pretty serious since it was agreed to by everyone." 89 How-
ever, Latty defends the language because it preserves flexibility in
judicial treatment.9 0
One person's "flexibility" is another's "ambiguity," and several
commentators have sharply criticized the uncertainty created by the
phrasing of section 300(b).91 However, the California provision is not
without defenders. According to one treatise, most "other" grounds
for attacking a "shareholders' agreement" would in actuality relate
to the proscribed bases of attack; in other words, most other D, E, or
F reasons for invalidating an agreement would really be variants of
the improper A, B, or C reasons mentioned in section 300(b). 92 Fur-
thermore, the California Legislature clearly intends to prevent the
courts from invalidating "shareholders' agreements" because of de-
viance from the corporate norm.9 3 According to the principal
87. Bradley, supra note 19, at 871; Note, supra note 6, at 448.
88. The Assembly committee report identifies the source as the North Caroli-
na Business Corporation Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-73(b), (c) (1975). REPORT OF
THE ASSEMBLY SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE REvISION OF THE CORPORATIONS
CODE 42 (1975), reprinted in 18 H. MARSH, supra note 1, at 243. See Bradley,
supra note 19, at 870 n.14.
89. Latty, The Close Corporation and the New North Carolina Business
Corporation Act, 34 N.C. L. REV. 432, 439 (1956). Professor Latty was the author
of the North Carolina close corporation statute. 1 H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING,
supra note 1, § 62.03[1], at 4-34; Bradley, supra note 19, at 871.
90. Latty, The Close Corporation and the New North Carolina Business
Corporation Act, 34 N.C. L. REV. 432, 439 (1956).
91. Bradley, supra note 19, at 870-71; Jordan, supra note 28, at 1115; Note,
supra note 6, at 448.
92. 1 H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, supra note 1, § 62.03[1], at 4-34.
93. 18 H. MARSH, supra note 1, § 21.1, at 61. Harold Marsh was the principal
draftsman of the new General Corporation Law. See also Bradley, supra note
19, at 871-72.
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draftsman of the North Carolina close corporation provisions, the
thrust of the North Carolina statute was "to set a friendly tone for
incorporated partnership arrangements.
'94
The controversy over section 300(b) demonstrates the uncertainty
generated by its negative phrasing. Section 300(c) of the new law is
more specific; it permits "shareholders' agreements" to waive or
alter any provision of the statute, with a few limited exceptions. The
nonwaivable statutory provisions are:
(1) section 158, defining a close corporation and regulating the
election and termination of close corporation status; 9
(2) sections 500 and 501, restricting "distributions to sharehold-
ers" ;96
(3) sections 1111 and 1201(e), specifying the votes required for the
merger of a close corporation into a non-close corporation and
for a "reorganization" (a term of art)97 which results in close
corporation shareholders receiving non-close corporation
shares;
(4) section 2009, defining the liability of shareholders for unau-
thorized distributions in a dissolution;
(5) sections 2010 and 2011, describing the continuation of the
corporation after dissolution for the purposes of winding up
and litigation;
(6) chapter 15, requiring corporate records and reports;
(7) chapter 16, defining shareholder inspection rights;
(8) chapter 18, describing involuntary dissolution;
(9) chapter 22, specifying crimes and penalties;
(10) all provisions dealing with the required filing of any document
with the secretary of state.
98
Assembly Bill 2510, presently pending in the legislature, 98a would
For a general discussion of the invalidation of shareholder contracts for being
contrary to the corporate norm, see generally H. HENN, CORPORATIONS §§ 257-90
(1961); 1 G. HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 151-65 (1959); 1 F.
O'NEAL, supra note 6, §§ 1.13-.15.
94. Latty, The Close Corporation and the New North Carolina Business
Corporation Act, 34 N.C. L. REV. 432, 438 (1956).
95. See text accompanying notes 7-29 supra.
96. "Distributions to shareholders" is a term of art which includes dividends.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 166 (West Supp. 1976).
97. See id. § 181 for the definition of "reorganization." "Reorganization" in
this sense is unrelated to bankruptcy.
98. 1 H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, supra note 1, § 62.03[21; 18 H. MARSH,
supra note 1, § 21.7, at 79-81.
98a. A.B. 2510, introduced by Assemblyman Knox on Feb. 13, 1978, makes a
705
add two more nonwaivable statutory provisions:9 8 b (1) section 417,
requiring that, if the shares of a corporation are divided into classes,
the share certificates contain a statement of the rights, preferences,
privileges and restrictions of each share; (2) section 418, providing
that, when applicable, certain types of information appear on a share
certificate.
Although section 300(c) explicitly states that "[a]ll other pro-
visions . . .may be altered or waived," 99 several commentators
have suggested other provisions that a court might find nonwaivable
despite the statutory mandate. Among the areas that have been sug-
gested as especially sensitive are section 300(d)'s shifting of liability
to the shareholders to the extent a "shareholders' agreement" re-
lieves the directors of managerial responsibility; 0 0 chapter 13's right
of dissent and appraisal; I0 section 315's requirement of shareholder
approval for corporate loans or for guarantees of loans to officers or
directors; I02 section 418(a)'s invalidation of restrictions on transfer
unless the proper legend is on the share certificates; 0 3 and section
309(a)'s imposition of fiduciary duties of loyalty and care on direc-
tors.1
0 4
The courts are especially likely to scrutinize closely any waiver of
statutory provisions which affects the rights of third parties. 0 5 One
authority has gone so far as to suggest that section 300(b) may permit
number of technical and substantive changes in the Corporations Code. A.B.
2510 (on file with the San Diego Law Review). As of May 30,1978, A.B. 2510 had
been passed by the Assembly and was pending before the Senate Judiciary
Committee. Telephone conversation with staff member of the Legislative Bill
Room (May 30, 1978).
98b. A.B. 2510, § 3 (on file with the San Diego Law Review).
99. CAL. CORP. CODE § 300(c) (West Supp. 1976).
100. 1 H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, supra note 1, § 62.03[2], at 4-36; Note,
supra note 6, at 453.
101. 1 H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, supra note 1, § 62.0312], at 4-36; Note,
supra note 6, at 452-53.
102. See authorities cited note 101 supra.
103. Jordan, supra note 28, at 1117.
104. Id., at 1116. One commentator has also suggested that the courts might
not permit §§ 300(e) and 310 to be waived. Note, supra note 6, at 452.53. This
result seems unlikely. Because § 300(e) is designed to inhibit the courts from
disregarding the corporate entity, there is no reason why the shareholders could
not unanimously eliminate this self-protection assuming they were foolish
enough to do so. See text accompanying notes 169-77 infra.
Section 310 deals with conflict of interest transactions between the directors
and the corporation-a sensitive area. Like § 300(b), § 310 has negative phrasing
and is therefore ambiguous. A discussion of the resulting uncertainty is beyond
the scope of this article. However, for an interpretation of the negative phrasing
in provisions somewhat similar to § 300(b), see 1 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP.
ACT ANN. § 41, at 844 (1971); Note, The Status of the Fairness Test Under
Section 713 of the New York Business Corporation Law, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1156
(1976). See also Bulbulia & Pinto, Statutory Responses to Interested Directors'
Transactions: A Watering Down of Fiduciary Standards?, 53 NOTRE DAME
LAw. 201 (1977).
105. Jordan, supra note 28, at 1116.
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waivers and alterations only to the extent that they deal with "man-
agement" of the corporation.10 However, this limitation seems too
narrow in view of the legislature's apparent adoption of a two-
pronged semi-paternalistic approach:0 7 to permit flexibility in
shareholder agreements and to protect against abuse of minority
shareholders by granting to any close corporation shareholder a non-
waivable statutory right to compel involuntary judicial dissolu-
tion.10
Some clarity as to what can be included in a "shareholders' agree-
ment" is furnished by section 204(a), which lists nine types of option-
al articles provisions and provides that any of them may be contained
in a "shareholders' agreement."'0 9 These provisions deal with the
assessment of shares, pre-emptive rights, special qualifications of
shareholders, durational limitation of corporate existence, super-
majority voting"0 or quorum requirements, restriction of corporate
business, conferrence of voting rights on debt instruments, confer-
rence upon shareholders of the right to determine the consideration
for stock, and requirements for shareholder approval for certain
types of action."'
Despite the uncertainty surrounding sections 300(b) and 300(c), it
also seems clear that "shareholders' agreements" may contain provi-
sions covering such subjects as the following:"
2
(1) who will be the officers and/or directors;
(2) whether long-term employment contracts will be awarded;
(3) what salaries will be paid;
(4) how much time each party to the "shareholders' agreement"
will devote to the business;
106. Metz, Organization, Shareholder and Voting Agreements, in 2 NEW
CAL. GCL, supra note 1, at 125.
107. See notes 163-68 and accompanying text infra.
108. See 1 H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, supra note 1, § 62.03[2], at 4-36.
109. CAL. CORP. CODE § 204(a) (West Supp. 1976). See also 18 H. MARSH, supra
note 1, § 21.7, at 82.
110. For a further discussion of super-majority voting provisions in "share-
holders' agreements," see 1 H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, supra note 1, §
62.03[3][a]; 18 H. MARSH, supra note 1, § 21.13.
111. CAL. CORP. CODE § 204(a) (West Supp. 1976); 1 H. BALLANTINE & G.
STERLING, supra note 1, §§ 51.03-.08; 16 H. MARSH, supra note 1, §§ 3.26-.36.
112. See O'Neal & Magill, supra note 34, at 1161 (from which this list is
drawn). For another list of permissible provisions, see 2 FORMS, supra note 67, at
8-204 to -212. For a discussion of shareholders' contracts in other jurisdictions,
see 1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 6, § 5.02. For forms for shareholders' contracts, see 8
J. RABKINS & M. JOHNSON, CURRENT LEGAL FORMS WITH TAX ANALYSIS ch. 20
(1977); 6 J. RABKINS & M. JOHNSON, supra ch. 15.
(5) what veto power each party to the "shareholders' agreement"
will have over major decisions;"
3
(6) when and how much of a dividend will be declared;
(7) what methods of resolving disputes will be employed."
4
Furthermore, as expressly sanctioned by section 300(b), a "share-
holders' agreement" can reallocate corporate distributions and
abridge board discretion." 5
It is unclear whether the clause on abridging board discretion
significantly changes prior case law in California. Courts in many
jurisdictions have held that contractual provisions abridging the
discretion of the board of directors are invalid because they are
contrary to the statutory norm of board control." 8 The California
case law in this area is sparse."' Nevertheless, several opinions have
held that shareholder contracts among all" 8 the shareholders of a
closely held corporation are enforceable even though the norm of
board control is violated." 9 Although section 300(b) may simply
codify the common law in California, conservative counsel will cer-
tainly be more comfortable with the express statutory permission to
abridge director discretion.
113. 1 H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, supra note 1, § 62.03[3][a].
114. 18 H. MARSH, supra note 1, § 21.7, at 80.
115. 1 H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, supra note 1, § 62.03[41[b]; 18 H. MARSH,
supra note 1, § 21.15.
116. E.g., McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (1934). See A.
FREY, J. CHOPER, N. LEECH, & C. MORRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORA-
TIONS 577 (2d ed. 1977); 1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 6, § 5.06; Berger, supra note 19, at
601; Note, supra note 6, at 445.
117. Jordan, supra note 28, at 1113. See Note, supra note 6, at 447. One
authority has suggested that statutory close corporations as well as nonstatu-
tory closely held corporations may conceivably be granted considerable flexi
bility in corporation governance by three statutory sections: CAL. CORP. CODE §
204(d) (West Supp. 1976) (permitting the articles to contain "[ajny other provision
not in conflict with the law, for the management of the business and for the
conduct of the affairs of the corporation") (emphasis added); id. § 212(b) (per-
mitting the by-laws to contain "any provision, not in conflict with law or the
articles for the management of the business and for the conduct of the affairs of
the corporation") (emphasis added); and id. § 312(b) (providing that officers
shall be chosen by the board except as otherwise provided in the articles or by-
laws). Bradley, supra note 19, at 879-80. As Bradley himself notes, however, this
reasoning is highly speculative. Id. See Jordan, supra at 1160; Note, supra at
447.
118. Merlino v. West Coast Macaroni Mfg. Co., 90 Cal. App. 2d 106, 111, 202
P.2d 748, 751 (1949); Conover v. Smith, 83 Cal. App. 227, 231, 256 P. 835, 836
(1927); Hyman v. Karl Stern Co., 47 Cal. App. 605, 606-07, 191 P. 47, 48 (1920).
Although Merlino involved a contract between two shareholders each owning
50% of the stock, the opinion states that "an agreement between stockholders
who own substantially all of the stock ... is enforceable." 90 Cal. App. at 111,
202 P.2d at 751 (emphasis added). But see Dulin v. Pacific Wood & Coal Co., 103
Cal. 357, 35 P. 1045 (1894) (dictum).
119. 1 H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, supra note 1, § 62.02[2]; 18 H. MARSH,
supra note 1, § 21.8; Jordan, supra note 28, at 1113-14.
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It is possible that a "shareholders' agreement" may also reallocate
the voting rights of shareholders, 120 but there is some uncertainty as
to the form the provision must take. Assume a corporation has three
shareholders with certificates for 100, 200, and 300 shares respec-
tively, nominally of one class of stock.
121
Three questions arise:
(1) Can a "shareholders' agreement" convert the certificates into
three classes of stock (classes A, B, and C) with each share of class A
having one one-hundredth of a vote, each share of class B having one
two-hundredth of a vote, and each share of class C having one three-
hundredth of a vote so that each shareholder would have exactly one
vote?
(2) Can a "shareholders' agreement" simply provide that each of
the shareholders has only one vote regardless of the number of shares
owned-that is, one shareholder, one vote?
(3) Can a "shareholders' agreement" require that all three share-
holders vote their shares in one block in accordance with the vote of a
majority of the three? In other words, can one clause of a "sharehold-
ers' agreement" be a pooling agreement?
All three arrangements would have the same effect so long as the
three owners held the same number of shares and remained the sole
stockholders. As to the first question, section 203 of the code states:
"Except as specified in the articles or in any shareholders' agree-
ment, no distinction shall exist between classes or series of shares or
the holders thereof." '122 Although this section indicates that a
"shareholders' agreement" can specify the rights of classes of stocks,
it is not clear that the agreement can create classes. Subdivisions (1)
and (2) of section 202(e) require the articles to specify the classes of
shares and the number of shares authorized. Although this type of
provision is not among the nine types of provisions expressly men-
tioned in section 204(a) as includible in "shareholders' agree-
ments,"'123 section 202(e) presumably may be waived by a "sharehold-
ers' agreement" pursuant to section 300(c).
124 As discussed earlier,12
this provision's list of nonwaivable provisions may not be exhaustive.
However, subdivision (e) of section 202, unlike other subdivisions of
120. Jordan, supra note 28, at 1117. See also O'Neal & Magill, supra note 34,
at 1161.
121. A slightly different example is given in Jordan, supra note 28, at 1117.
122. CAL. CORP. CODE § 203 (West Supp. 1976) (emphasis added).
123. See text accompanying notes 109-11 supra.
124. See 1 H. BALLANTiNE & G. STERLING, supra note 1, § 61.03[1].
125. See text accompanying notes 100-06 supra.
the section, does not seem essential for the protection of third parties
or existing shareholders. Moreover, other valid arrangements could
accomplish virtually the same result.126 Therefore, a "shareholders'
agreement" apparently may create different classes of stock and
specify their rights, even if the articles misleadingly state that only
one class of stock is authorized.
As to the second question posed earlier, one commentator has
concluded that a "shareholders' agreement" could provide that all
shareholders have one vote regardless of the number of shares
owned.127 Under such an agreement there would remain only one
class of stock, but voting would be "one shareholder, one vote," not
"one share, one vote." Again, there would seem to be no policy reason
to deny close corporation associates the flexibility of this kind of
arrangement.
The third question is whether one clause of a "shareholders' agree-
ment" may be a pooling agreement which provides that all three
shareholders vote their shares in one block in accordance with the
vote of a majority. The last sentence of section 300(b) reads: "This
provision does not apply to an agreement authorized under subdivi-
sion (a) of section 706. ' ' 128 Section 706(a) makes close corporation
pooling agreements valid and specifically enforceable. 2 9 I have
speculated elsewhere whether close corporation shareholders can opt
out of section 706(a) by entering into a pooling agreement which
expressly states that it is not made pursuant to section 706(a).130 It
is possible, however, that the courts would treat all pooling agree-
ments entered into between close corporation shareholders as "au-
thorized" under section 706(a) and therefore outside section 300(b). In
other words, if a pooling agreement were clause (f) of a document
entitled "Section 186 Shareholders' Agreement," the courts would
unquestionably enforce this clause and would treat it not as clause (f)
of a "shareholders' agreement" but as the sole clause of a separate
pooling agreement authorized by section 706(a).131 This distinction is
more than semantic. Unlike a "shareholders' agreement," a section
706(a) pooling agreement need not be filed with the secretary of the
corporation to be binding on transferees. 112 Furthermore, irrevocable
126. See text accompanying notes 33-36 & 60-66 supra.
127. Jordan, supra note 28, at 1117-19. See O'Neal & Magill, supra note 34, at
1161.
128. CAL. CORP. CODE § 300(b) (West Supp. 1976) (emphasis added).
129. See text accompanying notes 33-34 supra.
130. Wang, supra note **, at 1186. For a discussion of an analogous issue, see
text accompanying notes 159-61 infra.
131. 1 H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLNG, supra note 1, § 62.04[2J[a], at 4-59;
Jordan, supra note 28, at 1117-18.
132. CAL. CORP. CODE § 300(b) (West Supp. 1976); 1 H. BALLANTINE & G.
STERLING, supra note 1, § 62.04[2][a].
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proxies in section 706(a) pooling agreements have an express statu-
tory sanction 133 while section 705(e) does not explicitly refer to prox-
ies in "shareholders' agreements."' 134 Pooling agreements and "share-
holders' agreements" may also be treated differently under the
California Securities Law135 and conceivably under federal tax
law. 136
In any event, an attorney choosing among the three different ar-
rangements would probably be well-advised to select the section
706(a) pooling agreement. The statute expressly sanctions such
contracts, makes them specifically enforceable, and allows them to
be made self-executing through irrevocable proxies. 13 In addition,
pooling agreements are less likely to cause federal tax or California
Securities Law problems than are "shareholders' agreements."'
138
As noted earlier, 3 9 a "shareholders' agreement" may waive virtu-
ally all the provisions of the General Corporation Law. Rather than
retain power in the board and/or the shareholders and execute
contracts limiting voting discretion, close corporation associates
could also use a "shareholders' agreement" to shift power away from
the board and/or the shareholders to a single individual or group of
individuals.140 This realignment of control is distinct from the
abridgement of board discretion. Rather than obligate directors to do
certain acts-for example, mandate that they declare specified divi-
dends or employ certain individuals-the directors (or even the
shareholders) are simply stripped of most control over corporate
affairs. To illustrate, a "shareholders' agreement" might provide that
all corporate powers be exercised by a "Managing Shareholder" or
"President" to the extent permitted by the General Corpora-
tion Law.' 4' To the extent that any "shareholders' agreement" re-
133. CAL. CORP. CODE § 705(e)(5) (West Supp. 1976). See text accompanying
note 35 supra.
134. This does not mean that such proxies could not be made irrevocable. See
text accompanying notes 67-75 supra.
135. See text accompanying notes 235-304 infra.
136. See text accompanying notes 178-235 infra.
137. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 706(a), 705(e)(5) (West Supp. 1976). See text accom-
panying notes 33-36 supra. Another option would be a voting trust. See CAL.
CORP. CODE § 706(b) (West Supp. 1976). See also note 37 and text accompanying
notes 60-66 supra.
138. See text accompanying notes 178-304 infra.
139. See text accompanying notes 95-108 supra.
140. See 1 H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, supra note 1, § 62.03[3][e].
141. 2 Foms, supra note 67, forms 8.81, at 8-231 to -232, 8.82, at 8-237; "Share-
holders' Agreement" form drafted by O'Harn Company (on file with the San
Diego Law Review). For a similar form, see ORGANIZING, supra note 10, at 63-66.
lieves the directors of managerial duties, the new code shifts liability
to the shareholders who are parties to the agreement.
142
Unfortunately, it is unclear whether a "shareholders' agreement"
may eliminate the board entirely. 43 In practice, a corporation would
be well advised to retain a board if for no other reason than to ease
dealing with third parties.144 Nevertheless, the lack of a statutory
provision permitting elimination or sterilization of the board pro-
duces uncertainty as to whether the board must have some minimum
residual power, and if so, to what extent.
145
The principal advantage of depriving the board and/or the share-
holders of power is the procedural convenience of far fewer board
and/or shareholder actions (at a meeting or by written consent).146 A
"shareholders' agreement" does not really give more flexibility in the
allocation of power because even with a normally functioning board
and group of shareholders, it is still possible to allocate power to one
individual through classes of stock, a voting trust, or a pooling agree-
ment.
147
Another common desire of closely held corporation associates is to
create restrictions on the transfer of stock.148 Section 300(b) does not
explicitly refer to such restrictions. 149 Conceivably, the provision's
tolerance toward treating the corporation like a partnership could be
interpreted to permit even an absolute restraint on the transfer of
shares because partners may agree that without unanimous consent
no partner could transfer his interest. 50 This reasoning is highly
For other "shareholders' agreement" forms, see 3 H. BALLANTINE & G. STERL-
ING, supra note 1, app. A, form 3.01; 2 FoRMs, supra, form 8.80, at 8-215 to -229; R.
FLAHERTY & P. LEITER, CALIFORNIA CORPORATE PRACTICE GUIDE, form 55, at 294-
302 (1977).
142. CAL. CORP. CODE § 300(d) (West Supp. 1976).
143. 1 H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, supra note 1, § 62.03[3][c]; Jordan, supra
note 28, at 1120-21; Note, supra note 6, at 451-52.
144. See authorities cited note 143 supra.
145. Bradley, supra note 19, at 872-73. See Berger, supra note 19, at 603.
146. CAL. CORP. CODE § 307(b) (West Supp. 1976). Board action by consent
must be unanimous. See 16 H. MARSH, supra note 1, § 8.22; 17 H. MARSH, supra §
11.13.
147. Bradley, supra note 19, at 873. See note 37 supra. See also text accom-
panying notes 33-44 supra.
148. 1A H. BALLANTiNE & G. STERLING, supra note 1, § 210, at 10-36; 2 F.
O'NEAL, supra note 6, § 7.02; Note, supra note 6, at 453. See BuY-OUT, supra note
19, § 1.6.
149. Note, supra note 6, at 458-59. See Bradley, supra note 19, at 889. As noted
earlier in the text accompanying notes 30 and 31 supra, § 418(d) voids any
voluntary inter vivos transfer that would result in the number of shareholders
exceeding that set in the articles, provided the share certificates bear the legend
specified in § 418(c).
150. 1 H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, supra note 1, § 62.03[81[b), at 4-51; Note,
supra note 6, at 459. See also A. BROMBERG, CRANE AND BROMBERG ON PARTNER-
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speculative, however, and courts might well invalidate restrictions
they consider unreasonable. 51 Because restraints on transfer may be
imposed by contract, 5 2 it may be tempting to insert transfer restric-
tions in a "shareholders' agreement,"' 53 and several formbooks
contain "shareholders' agreements" with mandatory buy-out ar-
rangements and restrictions on transfer.5 4 Placing such restrictions
in "shareholders' agreements," however, may create problems under
the California Securities Law.
55
Recently, the Corporations Commissioner adopted rules which
treat the execution of a "shareholders' agreement" as a sale of a
security requiring qualification. 57 Under these new rules, share
transfer restrictions in the agreement would appear to be exempt
from qualification under subdivision (e)(11) of section 25103, which
refers only to "restrictions upon the transfer of shares in the articles
of incorporation or by-laws," although the Commissioner conceiv-
ably might take a contrary position.
5
Even though there is nothing to prevent the insertion of identical
or consistent transfer restrictions in the articles, by-laws, "share-
holders' agreements," or contracts, 59 it may be worthwhile to
minimize California Securities Law complications by using only a
contract. 6 It is unlikely that the courts will treat a transfer restric-
SHIP 43-44, 130-31, 239-40 (1968). An absolute restraint on transfer might jeopar-
dize the firm's status as a corporation under the Internal Revenue Code. See
text accompanying notes 178-86 infra. See also note 192 infra.
151. See note 150 supra. For a discussion of what constitutes a reasonable
restraint on transfer, see authorities cited notes 19 & 32 supra.
152. See authorities cited note 22 supra.
153. See 1 H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, supra note 1, § 62.03[8]; 1A H.
BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, supra § 210[2][c].
154. 3 H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, supra note 1, form 3.01, at A-37 to -40; 2
FORMS, supra note 67, form 8.80, at 8-223 to -224; R. FLAHERTY & P. LEITER,
CALIFORNIA CORPORATE PRACTICE GUIDE, form 55, at 295-301 (1977).
155. See generally notes 235-37 and accompanying text infra.
156. Note 156 has been omitted.
157. See notes 275-96 and accompanying text infra.
158. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25103(e)(11) (West Supp. 1976) (emphasis added). See
generally authorities cited notes 289-92 and accompanying text infra. See also
BUY-OUT, supra note 19, §9 1.9, 3.12.
159. See 1A H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, supra note 1, § 210[2][d]; 6 Z.
CAVITCH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 113.02[3) (1963).
160. But cf. notes 246-48 and accompanying text infra (stating that such a
contract apparently must be included as an exhibit in permit applications).
tion contract executed by all the shareholders any less tolerantly
than a "shareholders' agreement." Therefore, a transfer restriction
contract among all the shareholders of a close corporation may at-
tempt to opt out of sections 300(b) and 186 with a clause such as the
following: "This agreement is not made pursuant to section 300(b) of
the California Corporations Code and is not a 'shareholders' agree-
ment' as defined in section 186 of the California Corporations Code."
Because the new statute was intended to create more-rather than
less-flexibility for close corporation associates, the courts would
probably permit this opting out. Ironically, under certain circum-
stances, the California Securities Law may cause the "shareholders'
agreement" to become a trap rather than a new useful device as
intended.161
Summary
The "shareholders' agreement" is a new device available only to
shareholders of a statutory close corporation. Such an agreement can
abridge board discretion, reallocate corporate distributions, waive
virtually all the provisions of the General Corporation Law, and
eliminate the necessity of most shareholders' meetings and board
meetings by shifting power away from the board and the sharehold-
ers. Unfortunately, the negative phrasing of section 300(b), although
designed to increase flexibility, may instead have generated uncer-
tainty and confusion as to what other types of provisions validly may
be included in a "shareholders' agreement." Because of the ambigui-
ty of section 300(b), and because of federal tax and California Secu-
rities Law complications, 16 2 a "shareholders' agreement" generally
should not be used to reallocate voting power or to impose transfer
restrictions.
IV. DISADVANTAGES OF THE CLOSE CORPORATION AND
POTENTIAL HAZARDS OF UTILIZING CLOSE CORPORATION DEVICES
A. Shareholder Right to Petition for Involuntary Judicial Dissolu-
tion
Any shareholder of a close corporation has a statutory right to file
161. See text accompanying notes 283a & 283b infra. For a general discussion
of the California Securities Law problems of the close corporation, see text
accompanying notes 235-304 infra.
162. See text accompanying notes 178-304 infra.
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a complaint for involuntary judicial dissolution of the company.
163
This right cannot be waived in a "shareholders' agreement."'
16 4
One of the several grounds for involuntary dissolution of any
corporation (close or non-close) 65 is that those in control have been
persistently unfair toward any shareholder.'6 6 If a corporation has
thirty-five or fewer shareholders, another ground for involuntary
dissolution is protection of the rights or interests of the complaining
shareholder. 167 The legislature may have relied on this provision to
prevent the flexibility of the close corporation provisions from being
used to oppress minority shareholders.
168
B. Disregard of the Corporate Entity (The Alter Ego Doctrine)
Under certain circumstances a court either will hold the share-
holders of a corporation personally liable to one or more corporate
creditors 69 or will equitably subordinate debts owed by a corpora-
163. CAL. CORP. CODE § 1800(a)(2) (West Supp. 1976).
164. Id. Section 300(c) provides that none of the statutory provisions dealing
with involuntary dissolution may be waived by a "shareholders' agreement."
See text accompanying note 98 supra.
The non-waivable right to petition for dissolution is certainly not a benefit of
close corporation status. The articles of any corporation (close or non-close) can
give anyone the right to petition for involuntary dissolution. Id. § 1800(a)(4).
165. See id. § 1800(b); 1A H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, supra note 1, § 320.03;
18 H. MARSH, supra note 1, § 20.2; Note, California's New General Corporation
Law: Prospects for Minority Shareholders, 7 PAc. L.J. 706, 739-42 (1976). See
generally Comment, Dissolution Under the California Corporations Code: A
Remedy for Minority Shareholders, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 595 (1975).
166. CAL. CORP. CODE § 1800(b)(4) (West Supp. 1976). See Buss v. J.O. Martin
Co., 241 Cal. App. 2d 123, 50 Cal. Rptr. 206 (1966); 18 H. MARSH, supra note 1, §
20.2, at 11-12; Bradley, supra note 19, at 894. See generally F. O'NEAL, SQUEEZE-
OUTS OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS: EXPULSION OR OPPRESSION OF BUSINESS As-
SOCIATES § 9.09, .10, .14 (1975 & 1977 Supp.). Marsh notes that proceedings for
involuntary dissolution are in practice confined to closely held corporations. 18
H. MARSH, supra § 21.29.
167. CAL. CORP. CODE § 1800(b)(5) (West Supp. 1976). See 18 H. MARSH, supra
note 1, § 20.2, at 12-13; Jordan, supra note 28, at 1142-46; McKenzie, Close
Corporations in California, in 2 NEW CAL. GCL, supra note 1, at 495; Note,
California's New General Corporation Law: Prospects for Minority Share-
holders, 7 PAC. L.J. 706, 740-41 (1976).
168. See 1 H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, supra note 1, § 62.03[2]; Bradley,
supra note 19, at 895; Jordan, supra note 28, at 1144-46.
169. For an extensive review of the California cases dealing with this doc-
trine, see Associated Vendors Inc. v. Oakland Meat Co., 210 Cal. App. 2d 825,26
Cal. Rptr. 806 (1962); 1A H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, supra note 1, §§ 295-300;
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tion to its own shareholders.'70 The latter generally arises in the
context of federal bankruptcy proceedings 171 but is governed by the
same general principles as the former.172 One of the factors which
may influence a court to grant either remedy is the failure of the
corporation to comply with corporate formalities. 7 3 The new Code
provides that if a close corporation fails to hold meetings of the
directors or shareholders pursuant to a "shareholders' agreement,"
the failure to observe corporate formalities "shall not be considered
a factor tending to establish that the shareholders have personal
liability for corporate obligations.' 7 4 This protection is quite nar-
row. It does not prevent a court from piercing the corporate veil for
some other reason75 such as inadequate capitalization, commingling
of assets, or general considerations of equity;' 7 6 nor does it even
prevent a federal bankruptcy court from subordinating shareholder
debt claims in part because corporate formalities were waived in
a "shareholders' agreement." Although equitable subordination in a
bankruptcy proceeding would be governed by federal law,17 7 section
300(e) should still have some influence on a federal court.
17 H. MARSH, supra note 1, §§ 15.16-.25; Note, supra note 6, at 469-71. See Note,
Inadequate Capitalization as a Basis forShareholderLiability: The California
Approach and a Recommendation, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 823 (1972). For recent
California and non-California opinions discussing the alter ego doctrine, see
Bendix Home Syss., Inc. v. Hurston Enterprises, Inc., 560 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir.
1978); United States v. Standard Beauty Supply Stores, Inc., 561 F.2d 774 (9th
Cir. 1977); DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d
681 (4th Cir. 1976).
170. Costello v. Fazio, 256 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1958); E. LATTY & G. FRAMPTON,
BASIC BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 730-36 (1963); 17 H.
MARSH, supra note 1, § 15.26.
171. 17 H. MARSH, supra note 1, § 15.26, at 363.
172. See authorities cited note 170 supra.
173. Associated Vendors, Inc. v. Oakwood Meat Co., 210 Cal. App. 2d 825,840,
26 Cal. Rptr. 806, 815 (1962); 17 H. MARSH, supra note 1, § 15.19.
174. CAL. CORP. CODE § 300(e) (West Supp. 1976) (emphasis added). See 18 H.
MARSH, supra note 1, § 21.6.
175. Note, supra note 6, at 471-72.
176. See authorities cited note 169 supra.
177. See Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co., 306 US. 307 (1939); Costello v.
Fazio, 256 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1958); W. BLUM & S. KAPLAN, CORPORATE READJUST-
MENTS AND REORGANIZATIONS 395403 (1976); 3 J. MOORE, COLLIER ON BANKRUPT-
cy 9 57.14, 63.08, 65.06 (14th ed. 1977); 6 J. MOORE, supra 3.17 n.14 (14th ed.
1977); Rosenberg, Intercorporate Guaranties and the Law of Fradulent
Conveyances: Lender Beware, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 235, 236 n.2 (1976). See also
Herzog & Zweibel, The Equitable Subordination of Claims in Bankruptcy, 15
VAND. L. REV. 83, 85-88 (1961), in which the authors carefully distinguish between
subordination and disallowance, although they note that courts have frequently
confused the two concepts or have considered the question academic.
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C. Federal Tax Problems
Close corporation devices may create a number of federal tax
problems.
1. Denial of Corporate Status for Internal Revenue Code
Purposes
Some commentators have warned that if a "shareholders' agree-
ment" dispenses with corporate formalities, the firm's status as a
corporation under the Internal Revenue Code might be jeopar-
dized.1 18 1 am not so pessimistic.
The Internal Revenue Code states that "[t]he term 'corporation'
includes associations, joint-stock companies, and insurance com-
panies."' 17 9 The definition of "partnership" includes "a syndicate,
group, pool, joint venture, or other unincorporated organization,
through or by means of which any business, financial operation, or
venture is carried on, and which is not, within the meaning of this
title, a trust or estate or a corporation.' 8  Arguably, the refer-
ence to "other unincorporated organizations" would exclude any
closely held corporation from the definition of partnership. 181
Nevertheless, the courts and the Internal Revenue Service have
adopted a functional analysis to determine whether a business entity
is a corporation. 182 The landmark case in this area, Morrissey v.
Commissioner,' specified the following as the principal character-
178. Wisner, Tax Implications of the New California Close Corporation
Law, in 2 NEW CAL. GCL, supra note 1, at 189, 199-200. See Nelson, Summary of
Advantages and Disadvantages of Close Corporations Under the New Califor-
nia General Corporation Law, in 2 NEw CAL. GCL, supra at 211.
179. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(3) (emphasis added).
180. Id. § 7701(a)(2) (emphasis added).
181. This position was actually taken in O'Neill v. United States, 410 F.2d 888
(6th Cir. 1969). See Note, Close Corporations and the Federal Income Tax
Laws-Should the State Label Control?, 59 IowA L. REV. 552, 565, 571-72 (1974).
Bittker and Eustice, however, doubt that a local-law corporate label, without
more, would control. B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 2.01, at 2-2 n.1 (3d ed. 1971 & 1977 Supp.)
See Bittker, Professional Associations and Federal Income Taxation: Some
Questions and Comments, 17 TAX L. REV. (1961). But cf. Scallen, Federal
Income Taxation of Professional Associations, 49 MINN. L. REV. 603, 695-96
(1965) (arguing that the state label should be an important factor in deciding
whether to classify an entity as a corporation for tax purposes). The IRS now
treats a professional corporation as a corporation solely on the basis of the state
label. See note 188 infra.
182. B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 181, 2.01, at 2-3 to -4.
183. 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
istics of an "association" taxable as a corporation under the Internal
Revenue Code:
(a) associates; (b) an objective to carry on a trade or business and
divide the profits; (c) continuity of life of the enterprise, notwithstand-
ing the death, disability or withdrawal of its members; (d) centralized
management by representatives of the owners; (e) limited liability for
the owners; and (f) free transferability of beneficial interests in the
organization. 184
In 1960, these criteria were adopted by the Commissioner in Treasury
Regulation 301.7701-2, with a requirement that an association have
more of the significant corporate characteristics than noncorporate
characteristics to be classified as a corporation.185 Whether these
criteria are met is to be determined by state law. 8 '
By and large, closely held corporations have been treated as corpo-
rate entities for tax purposes.187 The Treasury's attempt in the 1960's
to deny corporate status to professional corporations was a resound-
ing failure.
188
While conceding that under the present state of the law closely
held corporations are taxed as corporations, one commentator has
argued that, in general, closely held corporations do not really meet
the Morrissey criteria.189 Nevertheless, the California statutory close
corporation seems no more vulnerable to attack than are closely held
184. B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAxATION OF CORPORATIONS
AND SHAREHOLDERS 2.01, at 2-5 (2d ed. 1966), summarizing Morrissey v.
Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344, 356-59 (1935). See Note, The Pennsylvania Techni-
cal Close Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue: A Hypothetical,
31 U. PITT. L. REv. 275, 277 (1969).
185. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2, 2 T.D. 6503, 1960-2 C.B. 413. See Zuckman v.
United States, 524 F.2d 729 (Ct. Cl. 1975); Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159
(1976); B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 181, V 2.02, at 2-6; id., 1 2.04, at S2-6 to
-8 (Supp. 1978); Note, supra note 181, at 567.
186. Treas. Reg. § 302.7701-1, 2 T.D. 6503, 1960-2 C.B. 412-20; B. BITTKER & J.
EUSTICE, supra note 181, V 2.01, at 2-2; Note, supra note 181, at 566.
187. 2 F. O'NEAL, supra note 6, at 8-135; Note, supra note 181, at 553. If most
closely held corporations were taxed as partnerships, double taxation would be
avoided, with uncertain effects on Treasury revenue. Of course, many of those
closely held corporations harmed by double taxation have already elected Sub-
chapter S status. See notes 200-01 and accompanying text infra.
188. In 1965, the IRS added a set of amendments to the definition of "associa-
tion" which were designed to deny corporate status to professional corpora-
tions. After a series of judicial decisions holding the amendments invalid, the
IRS finally capitulated in 1970.B. BrrTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 181, 1 2.02, at
2-7 to -8; Note, supra note 181, at 570-73. See Scallen, Federal Income Taxation
of Professional Associations, 49 MINN. L. REv. 603 (1965). Indeed, the Commis-
sioner now treats a professional corporation as a corporation solely on the basis
of the state label without bothering to apply the Morrissey criteria. Rev. Rul. 77-
31, 1977-1 C.B. 409.
189. Note, supra note 181, at 553, 573-75. Another commentator has warned
that counsel for Pennsylvania statutory close corporations must engage in
careful drafting to avoid the corporation being classed as a partnership. See
Note, The Pennsylvania Technical Close Corporation v. Commissioner of In-
ternal Revenue: A Hypothetical, 31 U. PITT. L. REv. 275 (1969).
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corporations generally. The principal devices available to the
California close corporation are the section 706(a) pooling agree-
ment' 90 and the "shareholders' agreement."'' None of the Morrissey
criteria would seem affected by a pooling agreement, and the only
Morrissey factor directly affected by a "shareholders' agreement"
would be "centralized management,"' 192 which is explained in Treas-
ury Regulation 301.7701-2 as follows:
Centralized management. To satisfy this factor, the exclusive,
continuing power to make necessary management decisions must be
concentrated in a managerial group (composed of less than all the
members), who have the authority to act on behalf of the organization
independently of its members. What is crucial is the focus of necessary
operating authority in the hands of a particular group, unlike the
"mutual agency" relationship of a partnership, where each member
can bind the organization by his acts; viz., the corporate form "abhors
anarchy of authority."'
193
Despite the reference in section 300(b) to partnership-like arrange-
ments,'19 4 the thrust of most "shareholders' agreements" will be to
shift control away from the board or the shareholders. 95 Although
this does violence to the traditional, almost Jeffersonian, structure of
the corporation (shareholders-board--officers), such agreements
may actually increase centralization of management by shifting pow-
er to a single "managing shareholder," "president," or other small
group. 196 It would be exceedingly unlikely that close corporation
associates would want to convert all the shareholders into agents for
the corporation. 1'9 7 So long as the "shareholders' agreement" is au-
190. See text accompanying notes 33-34 supra.
191.. See text accompanying notes 81-151 supra.
192. "Shareholders' agreements" relate primarily to the management of the
corporation. See text accompanying notes 86-147 supra. One commentator re-
fers to statutory "shareholders' agreements" as "shareholder management
agreements." Berger, supra note 19, at 601.
Conceivably, a "shareholders' agreement" might contain transfer restrictions;
but for the reasons already discussed, such provisions are more likely to be
inserted in separate contracts. As noted earlier, absolute restraints on transfer
are of dubious validity. Even if valid, such restraints would violate the Morris-
sey requirement of free transferability of beneficial interests in the organiza-
tion. See text accompanying notes 148-61 supra.
193. See B. BITTER & J. EusTicE, supra note 181, 1 2.02, at 2-6; Note, The
Pennsylvania Technical Close Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue: A Hypothetical, 31 U. PT. L. REV. 275, 280 (1969).
194. CAL. CORP. CODE § 300(b) (West Supp. 1976).
195. See text accompanying notes 86-119, 129-31, & 139-47 supra.
196. See notes 140-41 and accompanying text supra.
197. Such a "shareholders' agreement" would seem ill-advised in light of the
Morrissey criteria.
thoritarian rather than anarchic, it should not jeopardize the firm's
treatment as a corporation.
Although it is dangerous to speculate on the Internal Revenue
Service's motivation, it seems unlikely that the Commissioner would
bother to challenge the corporate status of California close corpora-
tions. The Treasury's potential revenue gain would be minimal, for a
close corporation always has the option of avoiding "shareholders'
agreements." In any event, any zealous attempt by the IRS to treat
statutory close corporations or closely held corporations as partner-
ships would probably be greeted with hostility not only by the courts
but by Congress, the latter having been traditionally solicitous to-
ward small business. For example, Subchapter S of the Internal
Revenue Code' 9 8 was enacted in 1958 to enable businessmen "to
select the form of business organization desired, without the necessi-
ty of taking into account major differences in tax consequences."' 99
2. Disqualification from Subchapter S Election
Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code allows a corporation to
be taxed in a manner similar to a partnership. 0 0 One of the prerequi-
sites for this election is that the corporation have only one class of
stock.201 The question arises whether a "shareholders' agreement"
might be treated as creating a separate class of stock disqualifying a
corporation from Subchapter S status. 0 2 The intent of the single
class of stock requirement was to avoid accounting complications
and to ensure simplicity in passing through income and loss to the
Subchapter S corporation's shareholders.
20 1
198. See notes 200 & 205-07 and accompanying text infra.
199. S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1958). See A & N Furniture &
Appliance Co. v. United States, 271 F. Supp. 40, 42-43 (S.D. Ohio 1967); Note,
Shareholder Agreements and Subchapter S Corporations, 19 TAX. L. REV. 391
(1964); Note, Taxation-Federal Income Tax-Effect of Close Corporation Vot-
ing Trust on Rights to Subchapter S Election, 21 VAND. L. REV. 167, 168 & n.7
(1967).
200. I.R.C. §§ 1371-1377. See 2 H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, supra note 1, §
483.01[3]; B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 181, 55 6.01-.11; Z. CAVITCH, TAX
PLANNING FOR CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS (1977); D. CRUMBLEY & P.
DAVIS, ORGANIZING, OPERATING, AND TERMINATING SUBCHAPTER S CORPORATIONS
64-65 (1974); I. GRANT, SUBCHAPTER S TAXATION (1974); 1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 6,
§§ 2.04a-.04f; ORGANIZING, supra note 10, at 32-33; I. SCHREIBER, S. GOLDEN, & S.
TRAuM, SUBCHAPTER S: PLANNING AND OPERATION (1976).
201. I.R.C. § 1371(a). See Z. CAVITCH, supra note 200, § 3.03[5]; 7 J. MERTENS,
LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 41B.09 (1976).
202. It is odd that Gordon, The New California View on Close Corporations
and Related Income Tax Opportunities Under Federal Subchapter S, 8
U.W.L.A. L. REV. 199 (1976), does not discuss this problem.
203. A & N Furniture Co. v. United States, 271 F. Supp. 40, 43 (S.D. Ohio
1967); Parker Oil Co., 58 T.C. 985, 990 (1972); S. REP, No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d
Sess. 87 (1958); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 119 (1954). See Note,
Shareholder Agreements and Subchapter S Corporations, 19 TA. L. REV. 391,
395-96 (1964); Note, Taxation-Federal Income Tax-Effect of Close Corpora-
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In 1963, the IRS ruled that a voting trust, pooling agreement, or
irrevocable proxy creating "disproportionate" voting rights con-
stituted a second class of stock.20 4 This view was criticized by several
commentators 25 and rejected by two courts (including the Tax
Court)20 6 on the basis that voting arrangements have absolutely no
effect on the pass-through of income and that the rigid Treasury
attitude consequently frustrated Congress's intent to grant flexibility
to small businesses.
20 7
Finally, the Commissioner conceded that pooling agreements, ir-
tion Voting Trust on Right to Subchapter S Election, 21 VAND. L. REV. 167, 169
(1967); 4 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 426, 429-30 (1973).
204. Rev. Rul. 63-226,1963-2 C.B. 341; B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 181,
6.02, at 6-6 to -7; W. PAINTER, supra note 48, at 152.
205. Laurie, Subchapter S After Six Years of Operation: An Analysis of Its
Advantages and Defects, 22 J. TAX. 166, 168-69 (1965); Note, StockholderAgree-
ments and Subchapter S Corporations, 19 TAX L. REV. 391 (1964); Note, Taxa-
tion-Federal Income Tax-Effect of Close Corporation Voting Trust on Right
to Subchapter S Election, 21 VAND. L. REV. 167, 172 (1967); 4 TEX. TECH. L. REV.
426 (1973).
206. Parker Oil Co., 58 T.C. 985 (1972), noted in 4 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 426 (1973).
See also A & N Furniture & Appliance Co. v. United States, 271 F. Supp. 40 (S.D.
Ohio 1967), noted in Note, Taxation-Federal Income Tax-Effect of Close
Corporation Voting Trust on Right to Subchapter S Election, 21 VAND. L. REV.
167 (1967).
207. In Parker Oil Co., 58 T.C. 985 (1972), the court stated:
Our views on the congressional intent as to the second class of stock
requirement in the definition of a subchapter S corporation is shared by
other courts .... We conclude that the overriding purpose of the re-
quirement that only one class of stock exist in a corporation qualifying
under subchapter S is to avoid complexities in taxing income to share-
holders with different preferences as to the distribution of profits...
Wle believe the intent of Congress is being thwarted. The alteration of
voting power brought about by the settlement agreement among Parker
Oil and its stockholders and the irrevocable proxy could not conceiv-
ably alter the reporting of the relative shares of the profits of the corpo-
ration by its stockholders. It created no complication as to the reporting
of income by the stockholders. The shifting of voting power for 5 shares
from Don W. Parker to M.N. Brown could not affect the distribution of
earnings in any manner.
The provisions of subchapter S were devised for small businesses.
Many such corporations are family owned and differences of opinion as
to management policies sometimes develop .... Surely such a practical
solution to discord within the corporation should not result in termina-
tion of subchapter S status by reason of a technical interpretation of the
one class of stock provision where there is no reason for imposing a
prohibition on the bare shift of voting power. We, therefore, hold that
under such circumstances section 1.1371-1(g), Income Tax Regs., and
Rev. Rul. 63-226, supra, are invalid to the extent that they hold a second
class of stock is created unless all of the shares outstanding are identical
as to all voting rights.
A proxy is a widely used corporate tool. It has a very practical purpose
even in a small, closely held corporation.
Id. at 990.
revocable proxies, and other such voting arrangements do not consti-
tute a second class of stock,2 8 but he indicated that he would still
argue that disproportionate voting rights in the articles of incorpora-
tion create a second class of stock.20 9 Although voting trusts were no
longer treated as creating a second class of stock, there remained the
possibility that they might violate the requirement that all share-
holders of a Subchapter S corporation be individuals or estates.210
Accordingly, Congress amended the Code in 1976 to make it clear
that voting trusts could be shareholders of corporations electing
Subchapter S status.21'
In light of the judicial decisions, the Commissioner's acquiescence,
and the Congressional solicitude re-demonstrated by the recent addi-
tion of section 1371(f) to the Code, it now seems settled that contrac-
tual voting arrangements among shareholders will not affect the
election. 212 Unless the Commissioner takes the position that "share-
holders' agreements" are the equivalent of articles of incorpora-
tion,213 voting provisions in "shareholders' agreements" will not dis-
208. Rev. Rul. 73-611, 1973-2 C.B. 312 (repealing Rev. Rul. 63-226, 1963-2 C.B.
341). See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 181, 6.02, at 6-7 n.15; Z. CAVITCH,
supra note 200, § 3.03[5][4]; W. PAINTER, supra note 48, at 152.
209. See authorities cited note 208 supra. See also 1 H. BALLANTINE & G.
STERLING, supra note 1, § 62.04[2][d].
210. I.R.C § 1371(a); B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 181, q 6.02, at 6-5;
Wang, supra note **, at 1172, n.4. See Lafayette Distribs,, Inc. v. United States,
397 F. Supp. 719 (W.D. La. 1975); A & N Furniture Co. v. United States, 271 F.
Supp. 40 (S.D. Ohio 1967). Both cases held that voting trusts did not disqualify a
corporation from Subchapter S status.
211. Tax Reform Act of 1976, § 902(c), I.R.C. § 1371(f)(2). See B. BITTKER & J.
EUSTICE, supra note 181, at S 6-2 (Supp. 1977); Z.CAvITCH, supra note 200, §
3.03[4][2]. See I.R.C. § 1371(f), which states in pertinent part that:
For purposes of subsection (a), the following trusts may be shareholders:
(2) A trust created primarily to exercise the voting power of stock
transferred to it.
In the case of a trust described in paragraph (2), each beneficiary of the trust
shall, for purposes of subsection (a)(1) [ten shareholder maximum], be treated as
a shareholder.
Id. (emphasis added).
Significantly, the new provision refers to "subsection (a)," not just subsection
(a)(2), which requires the shareholders to be individuals or estates. Arguably, the
language of new subsection (f) also pertains to subsection (a)(4) (the one class of
stock requirement), in which case the statute would preclude a voting trust from
creating a second class of stock for Subchapter S purposes.
I.R.C. § 1371(f)(1), (3), as added by Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, §
902(c)(2)(A), 90 Stat. 1520 (1976), also permits a shareholder of a Subchapter S
corporation to be a grantor trust (in which the grantor is taxable on the income)
and a testamentary trust (for a 60-day period only). See B. BiT'rKx & J. EUSTICE,
supra at S 6-2; Z. CAVITcH, supra § 3.03[4].
212. 1 H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, supra note 1, § 62.04[2][d], at 4-64;
Bradley, supra note 19, at 881 n.51.
213. One authority views this as a "subject of concern." 1 H. BALLANTINE &
G.'STERLING, supra note 1, § 62.03[3][d].
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qualify the corporation from Subchapter S election. The IRS prob-
ably will take a tolerant view, but conservative counsel may wish to
obtain an IRS ruling214 or to avoid the problem entirely by inserting
voting clauses in pooling agreements rather than in "shareholders'
agreements.
215
Provisions of "shareholders' agreements" which reallocate corpo-
rate distributions (dividends or liquidation payments) are an entirely
different matter. Such agreements would create the pass-through
complications which Congress wished to avoid by imposing the sin-
gle class of stock requirement.21 6 Therefore, any "shareholders'
agreement" reallocating dividends, liquidation payments, or other




Section 351 of the Internal Revenue Code provides that no gain or
loss will be recognized if property is transferred to a corporation
solely in exchange for its stock or securities, provided that the trans-
feror or transferors control the corporation immediately after the
exchange.2 18 The term "control" is defined in section 368(c) of the
Code to mean the ownership of at least eighty percent of the total
combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote, plus at
least eighty percent of the total number of shares of all other (non-
voting) classes of stock of the corporation.2 19 It is not clear concern-
214. See Wisner, supra note 178, at 197.
215. Under California law, a pooling agreement clause in a "shareholders'
agreement" may be treated as a contract completely separate from the "share-
holders' agreement." See text accompanying notes 129-38 supra.
216. 1 H. BALLANrINE & G. STERLING, supra note 1, § 62.03[4][b], [5][b]. See
Wisner, supra note 178, at 197. The Treasury and a federal district court in
California have both ruled that if the California Corporations Commissioner
compels differences in the stockholders' "rights and interest in the control,
profits and assets" of the corporation, Subchapter S status is lost. Paige v.
United States, 36 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 75-5122 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (emphasis added),
discussed in Bradley, supra note 19, at 881 n.51; Rev. Rul. 71-522,1971-2 C.B. 316.
217. Wisner, supra note 178, at 197. See 1 H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING,
supra note 1, § 62.03[4][b], [5][b].
218. I.R.C. § 351. See 2 H. BALLANTiNE & G. STERLING, supra note 1, § 483.02[4];
B. BiTTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 181, 9 3.01; Z. CAVITCH, supra note 200, §
4.03[2]; 3 J. MERTENS, supra note 201, § 20.41 (1972 & 1977 Supp.); [1977] 3 STAND.
FED. TAX REP. (CCH) T 2501.
219. I.R.C. § 368(c). See Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(a)(1) (1976); 2 H. BALLANTINE & G.
STERLING, supra note 1, § 483.02[4], at 996.29; B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra
note 181, 3.08; Z. CAVrrCH, supra note 200, § 4.03[2][a][ii].
ing the latter requirement whether the several classes of stock should
be lumped together for the purposes of calculating the necessary
"eighty percent of the total number." The Internal Revenue Service
has ruled that the transferors must have eighty percent of each
class .
2 0
A "shareholders' agreement" could create two problems. First,
even though a nontransferor-for example, a pre-existing sharehold-
er who does not transfer property-owns less than twenty percent of
the stock, a "shareholders' agreement" might be construed as giving
a nontransferor a percentage of control equal to or greater than
twenty percent.2 1 Second, it is conceivable that a "shareholders'
agreement" could be construed as creating separate classes of stock
held by each shareholder, each class having different rights. In other
words, each shareholder would hold a different class of stock.222 Any
nontransferor would own one hundred percent of his class of stock,
and the transferors would own zero percent. As previously men-
tioned, the Service takes the position that the transferors must have
eighty percent of each class of non-voting stock. If the nontrans-
feror's class of stock were considered "non-voting," the exchange
would not be tax-free under section 351.223
Unfortunately, the law in this area is so uncertain that it is impos-
sible to resolve these two issues. Surprisingly, there has not even
been a resolution of the impact of pooling agreements on the eighty
percent of "total combined voting power" prerequisite. At least one
authority states that the term "control" relates only to ownership
and not to whether the transferors actually control the corporate
affairs through their voting power.224 Another authority, however, is
more equivocal:
[T]here are almost no guides to the meaning of "total combined voting
power" or of "stock entitled to vote." It is usually assumed that the
computation of "total combined voting power" is not to take account
of shareholders' voting agreements or similar arrangements even
though they may alter the balance of power; but the question is not
foreclosed by case law or rulings.
225
In an attempt to avoid any "insufficient control" problem, the
transferors may be tempted to enter into the "shareholders' agree-
ment" subsequent to the transfer. If there is a pre-existing obligation
220. Rev. Rul. 59-259, 1959-2 C.B. 115. See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note
181, 1 3.08, at 3-30; Z. CAVrTCH, supra note 200, § 4.03[2][a][ii]; D. HERWITZ,
BusiNEss PLANNING 95 (1966).
221. Nelson, supra note 178, at 211; Wisner, supra note 178, at 198-99.
222. See text accompanying notes 201-17 supra.
223. See B. BrrTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 181, T 3.08, at 3-30 n.45. These
two problems are analogous in some respects to the separate class of stock
Subchapter S problem discussed earlier. See text accompanying notes 201-17
supra.
224. 3 J. MERTENS, supra note 201, § 20.47, at 172 (1972), citing Federal Grain
Corp., 18 B.T.A. 242 (1929).
225. B. BITTKER & J. EUSTIC., supra note 181, f 3.08, at 3-29 to -30.
724
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to enter into the "shareholders' agreement," the two transactions
would probably be integrated; but if there is no contractual commit-
ment to enter into the subsequent agreement, the control require-
ment will probably be unaffected. However, it is exceedingly dif-
ficult to make generalizations in this area of the law.
226
In light of the uncertainty, any individuals wishing to make a
section 351 tax-free exchange should not use a "shareholders' agree-
ment" or a pooling agreement to reallocate corporate distributions or
voting power in any manner which might conceivably jeopardize the
eighty-percent control requirement.227
4. Section 1244
A corporation which satisfies the requirements of section 1244
enables its common stockholders to treat losses on their investment
as ordinary rather than capital loss (up to a maximum of $25,000 a
year per shareholder, $50,000 on a joint return).228 To be eligible for
this special treatment, the securities must be "common stock.1229 If a
"shareholders' agreement" were to create dividend or liquidation
preferences, the stock so benefited might be considered ineligible
"preferred stock.1230 Unfortunately, it remains unsettled what sort of
preferences disqualify stock from section 1244.231 Furthermore, if
"preferred stock" is issued at the same time as "common stock," even
the common stock is ineligible for section 1244.232 This problem
might be partially avoided by entering into the "shareholders' agree-
ment" subsequent to the issuance of the shares.
233
226. Z. CAVITCH, supra note 200, § 4.03[2]. Compare B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE,
supra note 181, 3.10, with 3 J. MERTENS, supra note 201, § 20.47, at 170-72. See
also 3 J. RAB iN & M. JOHNSON, FEDERAL INcOME GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION §
31.02(4] (1977).
227. See Nelson, supra note 178, at 211; Wisner, supra note 178, at 198-99.
228. I.R.C. § 1244. See 2 H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, supra note 1, § 483.05;
B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 181, T 4.11; Z. CAVITCH, supra note 2001§
4.05; W. PAINTER, supra note 48, § 4.4.
229. See authorities cited note 228 supra.
230. See Evers, Threshold Checklist for California Close Corporations, in 2
NEw CAL. GCL, supra note 1, at 216.
231. See B. BrTTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 181, 4.11, at 4-46.
232. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1244(c)-1(c)(1), 1.1244(c)-1(b)(1) (1976); Z. CAvrrcH, supra
note 200, § 4.05[2][g]; 3B J. MERTENS, supra note 201, § 22.90c.
233. Another prerequisite of § 1244 stock is that it be issued pursuant to a
written plan which offers the stock for a specified period not exceeding two
years. I.R.C. § 1244(c)(1). See Z. CAVITCH, supra note 200, § 4.05[2][b]; 3B J.
MERTENS, supra note 201, § 22.90f. Once the plan has been adopted, there can be
no subsequent offering of "non-plan stock" while stock under the plan remains
unissued. The Commissioner considers any modification of a § 1244 plan as a
5. Disproportionate Liquidation Distributions
If assets are distributed upon liquidation other than in proportion
to stock ownership, the disproportionate "excess" payment may be
taxed as ordinary income rather than as capital gains.
234
6. Summary
A "shareholders' agreement" should not jeopardize an entity's
subsequent offering. Treas. Reg. § 1.1244(c)-1(h)(2) (1976). See 3B J. MERTENS,
supra § 22.90g, at 600. See also Comment, The Offering Provisions of LR.C.
Section 1244, 1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 91.
"Plan-stock" issued after such a subsequent offering of "non-plan stock"
would not qualify under § 1244, although the subsequent offering of "non-plan
stock" would not retroactively disqualify any previously issued "plan stock."
See I.R.C. § 1244(c)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.1244(c)-1(h) (1976); B. BITtR & J EUSTICE,
supra note 181, 4.11, at 4-47; 3B J. MERTENS, supra § 2290g.
The Treasury could take three possible positions regarding the subsequent
execution of a "shareholders' agreement" which reallocated corporate distribu-
tions and/or created preferences:
(1) The execution of the agreement does not constitute the offering of
any stock. But cf. text accompanying notes 275-80 infra (discussing the
California Corporations Commissioner's position that the execution of
a "shareholders' agreement" is a "sale" of securities to the contracting
parties).
(2) The execution of the agreement constitutes the issuance of "non-
plan" stock to any shareholders who gain preferences under the
contract but does not constitute a reissuance of stock to any sharehold-
ers who do not gain preferences.
(3) The execution of any "shareholders' agreement" reallocating
corporate distributions (even if preferences are not created) constitutes
a reissuance of "non-plan" stock to all shareholders whose distribution
rights are reallocated. The old stock would be "extinguished" and the"new" stock would not qualify under § 1244.
The first position is the most likely.
234. See I.R.C. §9 331, 333, 337; Kintz, Tax Considerations in Forming,
Operating and Dissolving Corporations Under the New California General
Corporation Law, in 2 NEw CAL. GCL, supra note 1; Nelson, supra note 178, at
211; Wisner, supra note 178, at 9. See generally I.R.C. §§ 911(b), 1348; B. BITTKER
& J. EUSTICE, supra note 181, IN 4.20-.22; Z. CAVITCH, supra note 200, 99 11.02-.03;
W. PAINTER, supra note 48, § 10.2-.4; Kintz, supra at 104; Wisner, supra at 195.
911(b), 1348; Kintz, supra at 104; Wisner, supra at 195.
The disproportionate allocation of profits in a "shareholders' agreement"
,should not mix salary and dividends. Otherwise a shareholder who receives
disproportionately large dividends under a "shareholders' agreement" will be
forced to pay taxes at a rate higher than the maximum 50% rate which would
have been imposed had the payment taken the form of salary. See I.R.C. §
911(b), 1348; Kintz, supra at 104; Wisner, supra at 195.
One commentator has raised the issue whether the execution of a "sharehold-
ers' agreement" creating disproportionate profit sharing could itself be con-
sidered a taxable event or could result in taxes being due when profits were
earned even if not paid out. Id. at 194. See Kintz, supra at 103-04. Cf. Sol
Diamond, 56 T.C. 530 (1971), aff'd 492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974), noted in
Comment, Income Regulation of Future Interests in Partnerships Profits and
Losses-Taxation-Federal Income Tax-Diamond v. Commissioner (T.C.
1970), 9 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 373 (1972), Cowan, Receipt of an Interest in Partner.
ship Profits in Consideration for Services: The Diamond Case, 27 TAx L. REV.
161 (1972), Note, The Right to Income as Taxable Income, 26 BAYLOR L. REV. 649
(1974), Note, Federal Taxation-Is Diamond a Syndicator's Worst Friend?, 10
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 795 (1974) (holding that a partner who receives a partner-
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status as a corporation under the Internal Revenue Code. Although
voting provisions in a "shareholders' agreement" probably would not
affect the Subchapter S election, it would be wise to circumvent the
problem through the use of pooling agreements (or voting trusts),
which definitely do not create a disqualifying separate class of stock.
A disproportionate reallocation of corporate distributions in a
"shareholders' agreement" would make the corporation ineligible for
Subchapter S and would create other tax complications as well. If at
all possible, therefore, a corporation should avoid these problems by
issuing stock in direct proportion to economic interests (without any
reallocation of distributions) and use a pooling agreement or a voting
trust to differentiate the pattern of control from that of economic
ownership.
D. California Securities Law Problems
As is generally known, California has its own Corporate Securities
Law which regulates the offer and sale of securities within the
state.211 Such an offer or sale must be approved or "qualified" by the
Department of Corporations, unless an exemption is available.
23 6
Close corporation voting arrangements and "shareholders' agree-
ments" may run into difficulties under several provisions of the
California Corporate Securities Law 
2sV
1. Attachment as Exhibit to Applications for Permit
In June, 1976, the Department of Corporations stated that an ap-
plicant's "most reasonable approach" in obtaining a permit for the
original issuance of shares would be to include a copy or description
of "all agreements, including shareholder agreements that are known
to the applicant . . . which . . . would be considered necessary in
order to determine whether the proposed transaction is fair, just, and
equitable."
23 8
ship interest in exchange for services already performed has immediately tax-
able income under I.R.C. § 61). See also A. WILLIS, HANDBOOK OF PARTNERSHIP
TAXATION §§ 11.02-.06 (1971) (commenting upon Sol Diamond). See generally
I.R.C. §§ 61, 83.
235. 2 H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, supra note 1, § 434; R. JENNINGS & H.
MIARSH, SEcURITIEs REGULATION-CASES AND MATERIALS 585-87 (3d ed. 1972); H.
MARSH & R. VOLK, note 63 supra (1976); Sterling, Offering, Selling, and Issuing
Securities, in ORGANIZING, supra note 10, at 163. (1973 & 1977 Supp.).
236. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25110, 25120, 25130 (West Supp. 1976); 2 H. BALLAN-
TINE & G. STERLING, supra note 1, § 439. The head of the Department of Corpora-
tions is the Corporations Commissioner.
237. Buxbaum, Aspects of State and Federal Securities Regulation Under
the New Code, in 2 NEw CAL. GCL, supra note 1, at 401, 403-05.
238. CORP. SEC. NEWSLETTER, June, 1976, at 5.
On February 9, 1977, the Commissioner proposed a set of regula-
tions to deal with the problems created by the statutory close corpo-
ration provisions of the new General Corporation Law.239 In light of
the comments received, a revised set of proposed regulations was
released on September 14, 1977; 240 and, after more changes, a set of
rules was finally adopted on May 12, 1978.24°a The February and the
September proposals and the finally adopted rules added "share-
holders' agreements" to the definition of "charter documents. '2 41 The
May, 1978 rules also added the following to the exhibits required in
applications for qualification by permit:
charter documents [and] a copy of any agreement made or to be made
by or among shareholders of the issuer which materially affects, or
will materially affect, any of the rights, preferences, privileges or
restrictions of or on securities of the issuer or the management of the
issuer (including any voting agreement, irrevocable proxy or share-
holders' agreement) [or a description of the agreement if a copy is not
available to the issuer].
242
In short, "shareholders' agreements," pooling agreements, and irrev-
ocable proxies will have to be disclosed in permit applications.
243
Voting trusts are not specifically mentioned but apparently must also
be filed with or described on the permit application.2 44 Release
55-C, which accompanied the May 12, 1978 rules, states that the
permit application forms "have been amended to require the inclu-
239. Dep't of Corporations, State of California, Proposed Changes in the
Rules of the Commissioner of Corporations Under the Corporate Securities
Law of 1968 (Feb. 9, 1977) (on file with the San Diego Law Review). See 1 H.
BALLANTiNE & G. STERLING, supra note 1, § 60.01[2][b], at 4-9.
240. State of California, Dep't of Corporations, Text of Proposed Rules
Changes Under the Corporate Securities Law of 1968 Pursuant to Notice of
Proposed Changes (Sept. 14, 1977) (on file with the San Diego Law Review).
240a. Dep't of Corporations, Order Adopting and Amending Regulations of
the Commissioner of Corporations (May 12, 1978) (on file with the San Diego
Law Review).
241. Proposed Amendments to § 260.001 (Feb. 9,1977 and Sept. 14, 1977) (on
file with the San Diego Law Review); Adopted Amendments to § 260.001 (May
i2, 1978) (on file with the San Diego Law Review). This also brings "sharehold-
ers' agreements" within Rule 260.140.8 (dealing with restrictions on the transfer
of stock). 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 260.140.8 (1978).
242. Adopted Amendments to Items 21(A) and (D) of § 260.113, 10 CAL. ADMIN.
CODE § 260.113 (1978), Items 15(C) and (E) of § 260.121.1(a), id. § 260.121.1, Items
14(C) and (G) of § 260.121.1(b), id. § 260.121.1 (May 12, 1978) (on file with the San
Diego Law Review). The February, 1977 and September, 1977 versions of the
proposed rules contain almost identical amendments.
243. In the case of qualification by permit, the burden is on the applicant to
show that the transaction is fair, just, and equitable. Otherwise, the Department
of Corporations may refuse to issue a permit. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25140(b) (West
Supp. 1976); R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION-CASES AND
MATERIALS 587 (3d ed. 1972); 1 H. MARSH & R. VOLK, supra note 63, § 8.01.
244. An interest or certificate in a voting trust is a security under the Califor-
nia Securities Law. See note 63 supra. Section 25102(f) of the Corporations Code
exempts from § 25110 any offer or sale of a voting trust interest if, after the
"sale," the interests are held by no more than five persons. See note 63 supra.
(Section 25110 requires the qualification of "issuer transaction" offers and
sales). Although interests in a voting trust need not be qualified under § 25110,
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sion. . . of agreements among shareholders, including but not lim-
ited to shareholders' agreements, voting agreements and irrevocable
proxies. ' '244 a It would be anomalous if voting trusts did not need to be
disclosed, because they have much the same effect as pooling agree-
ments.245
A contract among the shareholders imposing restraints on the
transfer of shares materially affects the rights and restrictions of
shares 246 and apparently must be described or included as an exhibit
in a permit application.247 Oddly, thus far there has been no proposal
to amend Rule 26 0.140. 8,247a which refers to "charter documents"
only and which previously has been interpreted to preclude review of
transfer restrictions in private contracts.
2 48
2. The Small Offering Exemption
The most frequently used 249 Corporate Securities Law issuer ex-
emption is section 25102(h),25 0 which deals with "small offerings."
the trust might still have to be disclosed in an application for a permit to issue
other securities.
244a. Dep't of Corporations Release 55-C, at 8-9 (May 19, 1978) (emphasis
added) (on file with the San Diego Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Release 55-
C].
245. See Wang, supra note **, at 1176-78 and authorities cited therein. See
also id., at 1171-73 and authorities cited therein.
246. Cf. note 242 and accompanying text supra (discussing the proposed
changes in the exhibits required in an application for qualification by permit).
247. Among the new exhibits required in applications for qualification of
recapitalizations and reorganizations are copies of "any contract to be made by
the issuer affecting any of the rights, preferences, privileges, or transferability
of the securities." Adopted Amendments to Item 15(D) of § 260.121.1(a) and Item
14(E) of § 260.121.1(b) (May 12, 1978) (emphasis added) (on file with the San Diego
Law Review). Copies of such contracts were already required as exhibits in
general permit applications. Item 21(c) of Rule 260.113, 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §
260.113 (1978).
247a. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 260.140.8 (1978).
248. 1 H. MARSH & R. VOLK, supra note 63, § 8.02[3][k][v]. See 3 H. BALLANTINE
& G. STERLING, supra note 1, at A-121 n.16. See also 1 H. BALLANTINE & G.
STERLING, supra § 63.05[1][b], at 4-99.
249. 2 H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, supra note 1, § 438.01, at 876.6.
250. Id. § 438. See generally 1 H. MARSH & R. VOLK, supra note 63, § 4.02.
Although both § 25102(h) and § 158(d) (defining the statutory close corporation)
have a 10-shareholder limitation, the definition of "shareholder" is not the same.
Section 158 refers to shareholders "of record." See authorities cited note 11 and
accompanying text supra. On the other hand, § 25102(h) uses a beneficial own-
ership test. Although § 158(d) in most cases counts a partnership, corporation, or
trust as one shareholder, § 25102(h) would treat as beneficial holders each of the
partners, shareholders, and (subject to limited exceptions) trust beneficiaries.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(h)(5) (West Supp. 1976); Rule 260.102.5, 10 CAL. ADMIN.
CODE § 260.102.5 (1978); Rule 260.102.5(b) (May 12, 1978) (on file with the San
This section exempts from qualification any offer or sale of voting
common if, after issuance, there will be only one class of stock owned
beneficially by no more than ten persons. Certain additional require-
ments must be met. Among these is a stipulation that upon the initial
organization of a corporation the same consideration per share must
be paid by each shareholder.
251
In the past, the Corporations Commissioner's rules and forms re-
ferred to this exemption as the "Close Corporation Exemption," but
section 25102(h) is independent of the definition of "close corpora-
tion" in section 158.252 Therefore, the Department of Corporations
has changed the name of the section 25102(h) exemption in its rules
and forms to the "small offering" exemption. Actually, this term is
slightly misleading, because the dollar amount of the issue need not
be small. A more accurate name would be the "limited distribution"
or "small number of shareholders" exemption, but these terms pre-
sumably are too cumbersome. Henceforth, this article will adopt the
new term: "small offering exemption."
In a release and in newsletters in 1977, the Commissioner warned
that a "shareholders' agreement" or other arrangement such as a
pooling agreement may make the small offering exemption unavail-
able by in effect creating a second class of stock2 3 or by reallocating
dividends and other corporate distributions in such a way as to
nullify the section 25102(h)(3) requirement that the same con-
sideration per share be paid upon initial organization.
254
The first part of this warning was incorporated in Rule
260.102.4(b), which provides:
A corporation does not have "only one class of stock" outstanding if,
at the time its shares are issued, there exists or is presently intended to
be executed a shareholders' agreement pursuant to which any of the
rights, preferences, privileges, or restrictions upon its shares, as
Diego Law Review); CORP. SEC. NEWSLETTER, March, 1977, at 10; ESCROW NEWS-
LETTER, June 1977, at 2. See 1 H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, supra note 1, §
61.01[21[b]; 18 H. MARSH, supra note 1, § 21.4, at 70.
251. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(h)(3)(i), (ii) (West Supp. 1976). See generally 2 H.
BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, supra note 1, § 438; 1 H. MARSH & R. VOLK, supra
note 63, § 4.02.
252. See 1 H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, supra note 1, § 60.01[2J[b]; 18 H.
MARSH, supra note 1, § 21.4, at 70; 1 H. MARSH & R. VOLE, supra note 63, § 4.02[3].
See also note 250 supra.
253. Dep't of Corporations Release 50-C, at 5 (1977) (on file with the San Diego
Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Release 50-C]; CORP. SEC. NEWSLETTER,
March, 1977, at 10; ESCROW NEWSLETTER, June, 1977, at 2. See 1 H. BALLANTINE &
G. STERLING, supra note 1, §§ 60.01[2][b], 62.03[4][c], [5J[c]; 18 H. MARSH, supra
note 1, § 21.4, at 72-73; 1 H. MARSH & R. VOLE, supra note 63, § 4.02[3].
254. Release 50-C, supra note 253, at 5 (1977); CORP. SEC. NEWSLETTER, March,
1977, at 10. Section 116 of the Corporations Code states that nothing in the 1977
General Corporation Law modifies § 25102(h) of the Securities Law. CAL. CORP.
CODE § 116 (West Supp. 1977).
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enumerated in Subdivision (e) of Section 25103 of the Code,[254a are or
would be modified as to any such shares, or as to the holders of any
such shares, in a manner not applicable to all outstanding shares.
255
Clearly, the Department's goal is to make a company ineligible for
the small offering exemption if there will be a "shareholders' agree-
ment" creating disproportionate rights. In many cases, however, it
will be difficult to determine whether shareholder rights are dispro-
portionate.2 57 This article earlier gave an example of a "sharehold-
ers' agreement" which provided that each shareholder had one vote
regardless of the number of shares held (one shareholder, one
vote).258 If the shareholders own different numbers of shares, from
one point of view there is a disproportionate dilution of the voting
power of each shareholder. From another perspective, however, all
shares are disenfranchised in favor of the individual shareholders, so
that all shares are equally adversely affected.
Suppose a "shareholders' agreement" retained the board of direc-
tors but shifted almost all power away from the board to a "Manag-
ing Shareholder" for an indefinite term. On the one hand, it might
appear that such an agreement has a disproportionate effect because
all shares except those held by the "Managing Shareholder" are
deprived of any meaningful power. On the other hand, because the
directors have little function, all shares arguably lose significant
voting rights." 9
A further complication is added by section 25102(h)'s requirement
that all stock be "voting common." 260 When the board has little
function, the Commissioner could conceivably argue that all the
shares are effectively non-voting despite some residual power-for
example, approval of organic changes, articles amendments, and new
issuances of stock261-and despite their right to elect directors. Al-
254a. Included in § 25103(e)'s list are changes in dividend, liquidation, and
voting rights. See note 290 and accompanying text infra.
255. Rule 260.102.4(b) (May 12, 1978) (emphasis added) (on file with the San
Diego Law Review).
256. Note 256 has been omitted.
257. See 18 H. MARsH, supra note 1, § 21.4, at 72-73. Marsh gives two examples
of "shareholders' agreements," one of which clearly would create a second class
of stock, and one of which clearly would not. He then notes that there are an
"almost infinite number of variations... between the two extremes... used as
illustrations." Id., at 73.
258. See text accompanying note 121 supra.
259. Cf. text accompanying notes 293-96 infra (discussing potential inconsis-
tencies between the Department's positions in this and in an analogous area).
260. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(h) (West Supp. 1976).
261. See generally 2 FoRms, supra note 67, forms 8.80, at 8-221, 8.81, at 8-231 to
-232.
though the Department. has warned that voting agreements may
create disqualifying "non-voting" common, 262 it has not given any
explanation-much less a rule defining what constitutes disen-
franchisement.
A company must file a form notifying the Commissioner when the
section 25102(h) exemption is utilized.283 Item 2 of the form is a
statement that, immediately after the issuance and sale of the shares,
the issuer had only one class of stock outstanding.
264
The May, 1978 amendments add to this form a question whether
the issuer is a "close corporation" and whether, to the issuer's best
knowledge, "its shareholders or proposed shareholders have not en-
tered into or granted, and presently do not intend entering into or
granting, a shareholders' agreement, voting agreement, irrevocable
proxy or other arrangement the effect of which would cause the
statements contained [therein] to be incorrect. ' 265 This question is
extremely difficult to answer. First, it is not clear whether the phrase
"other arrangement" encompasses a voting trust. Second, the De-
partment's new rules do not indicate when, if ever, pooling agree-
ments, irrevocable proxies,266 and voting trusts create a second class
of stock2 67 (or a disqualifying disenfranchisement of stock). As previ-
ously mentioned, Rule 260.102.4(b) provides that a "shareholders'
agreement" can effectively create a second class of stock; but it says
nothing about other voting arrangements which accomplish the same
reallocation of voting power. However, Release 55-C, which accom-
panied the May, 1978 rules, warned that "voting agreements or irrev-
ocable proxies may be inconsistent with the requirements of [section]
25102(h) . . . depending upon the circumstances and/or upon
262. Release 55-C, supra note 244a, at 7; Release 50-C, supra note 253, at 5;
CORP. SEC. NEWSLETTER, March, 1977, at 10.
263. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(h)(5); Rule 260.102.8, 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §
260.102.8 (1978).
264. Rule 260.102.8, 10 CAL. ADnN. CODE § 260.102.8 (1978).
265. Rule 260.102.8, Item 5 (May 12, 1978) (emphasis added) (on file with the
San Diego Law Review).
266. Under § 705(e), a bare proxy may still be revoked, even if stated to be
irrevocable, unless "it is given to secure the performance of a duty." But cf.
Berger, supra note 19, at 593-95 (suggesting an interest in the corporation gener-
ally may be sufficient to enable a proxy to be made irrevocable under § 705(e)).
Nevertheless, an irrevocable proxy contained in a pooling agreement should be
irrevocable under § 705(e) because it is given to secure the performance of a
contractual obligation to vote in a certain manner. See Wang, supra note **, at
1181-85 and authorities cited therein.
Because of the questionable validity of bare irrevocable proxies, the rest of
the discussion will emphasize the effect of pooling agreements and voting trusts
on the small offering exemption.
267. See also Bradley, supra note 19, at 881 n.51, which states: "No reason
exists to think that shareholder agreements, proxies, voting trusts or anything
of the sort will jeopardize the [§ 25102(h)] exemption."
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whether or not the arrangement is a part of a plan to evade the
protective provisions of the small offering exemption.
' 267a
In 1973, the Commissioner gave the following opinion:
The first question. .. is whether the voting trust certificates consti-
tute a second class of stock of Libby so as to disqualify Libby for the
Section 25102(h) exemption, which is not available to an issuer if
immediately after the issuance there is more than one class of stock of
the issuer outstanding. We concur. . . that Libby is not the issuer of
the voting trust certificates, and that therefore these securities do not
constitute a second class of stock of Libby.
268
The nexus between the two sentences is elusive. Even though a
corporation is not the issuer of voting trust certificates, the trust can
affect the voting rights of shares of which the corporation is an
issuer, and this could be viewed as creating separate classes of stock.
The opinion, however, seems to presume that second classes of stock
are only created when the corporation itself issues stock with differ-
ent rights. This implicit rationale is far-reaching and would prevent
all contractual voting arrangements from disqualifying an issuer
from section 25102(h). In Release 55-C, the Department expressly
qualified this earlier ruling and noted that certain voting trusts
create a disparity in voting rights and that under these circumstances
"the securities law contemplates that the qualification process will
be used.
2 69
"Shareholders' agreements," voting trusts, pooling agreements, ir-
revocable proxies, and other such arrangements present the Depart-
ment of Corporations with a formidable line-drawing problem. At
one extreme is a charter provision creating disparate voting rights; at
the other extreme is a voting arrangement entered into by a small
minority of the shareholders (e.g. an irrevocable proxy granted by
one shareholder to another for a short period). "Shareholders' agree-
ments" are executed by all the shareholders of the corporation and
arguably are akin to charter provisions. This argument, however,
leads to a classic conceptual slippery slope. Voting trusts and pooling
agreements among all the shareholders of a close corporation are
indistinguishable in effect from voting provisions in "shareholders'
agreements." Treating the three differently would not only be illogi-
cal but would also create the nightmarish problem of identifying
borderline arrangements as one or the other. Pooling agreements in
267a. Release 55-C, supra note 244a, at 7.
268. Dep't of Corporations, State of California, Commissioner's Opinion No.
73/43C, at 2. See 2 H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, supra note 1, § 455.04[2].
269. Release 55-C, supra note 244a, at 8. See authorities cited note 253 supra.
which all the parties grant irrevocable proxies to one party are very
much like voting trusts. 70 In addition, as mentioned earlier, the
courts may treat a voting clause in a "shareholders' agreement" as a
pooling agreement completely separate from the other parts of the
"shareholders' agreement. 2 71
If voting trusts and pooling agreements among all the shareholders
of a close corporation can disqualify the issuer from the section
25102(h) exemption, what about voting arrangements among most or
some of the shareholders of close or non-close corporations? As to
the investor whose voting rights are adversely affected or eliminated,
such arrangements can have the same effect as charter provisions or
unanimous shareholder contracts. Thus, by creating the "sharehold-
ers' agreement," the new Code has precipitated a re-examination by
the Commissioner of the effect of all shareholder voting contracts on
the small offering exemption. Ironically, this re-examination appears
to have resulted in less flexibility for shareholders of both close and
non-close corporations; but the Department has been unwilling to
draw a line on the slippery conceptual slope just discussed. Release
55-C gives little guidance as to when voting arrangements are incon-
sistent with the requirements of section 25102(h).
271a
The February, 1977 proposed version of the rules denied the small
offering exemption "with respect to any transaction which, although
in technical compliance with such exemption, is part of a plan or
scheme to evade the qualification provisions . . . contrary to the
objectives of Subdivision (h) of Section 25102 and the purposes and
policies underlying the Corporate Securities Law of 1968." '2 72 This
language was deleted from the final version of the regulations, with
the explanation that:
The Department believes that the foregoing is an accurate forecast
of the position which would be taken by the courts with respect to an
issuance under the small offering exemption involving the use of
shareholders' agreements, voting agreements, irrevocable proxies or
other, arrangements in a manner inconsistent with the terms of that
exemption (People v. Davenport, 13 C.2d 681; SECv. Harwyn Indus-
tries Corp., 326 F. Supp. 943 (1971); Oil Lease Service, Inc. v. Stephen-
son, 162 C.A.2d 100) and that it is therefore unnecessary, and possibly
inappropriate, to include such a statement in the rules.
273
The three cases cited by the Department did not involve section
25102(h). Davenport and Oil Lease Service both state that in decid-
ing whether an instrument is a "security" under the California Secu-
270. See notes 37-39 & 76-80 and accompanying text supra.
271. See text accompanying notes 129-31 supra.
271a. See note 267a and accompanying text supra.
272. Proposed Rule 260.102.12(d) (Feb. 15, 1977) (on file with the San Diego
Law Review).
273. Release 55-C, supra note 244a, at 7.
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rities Law, the courts may look through mere form to substance.




The official "Notice of Issuance of Shares" under the section
25102(h) exemption requires an opinion of counsel that the exemp-
tion is available. 7 4 Attorneys will be extremely reluctant to sign the
opinion if any shareholders have executed or intend to execute a
pooling agreement or a voting trust. Rather than use uncertainty as a
weapon, the Commissioner should directly confront the problem of
the effect of pooling agreements and voting trusts on the section
25102(h) exemption.
3. Sale Because of a Change in the Rights of an Outstanding
Security
Section 25017(a) of the California Securities Law defines a change
in the "rights, preferences, privileges or restrictions of or on out-
standing securities" as a sale of securities. Such a "sale" must be
qualified or approved by the Department of Corporations unless an
exemption is available. 7 5 The broad definition of "sale" produces
two issues: Under what circumstances does the execution of a
"shareholders' agreement" or other shareholders' arrangement
constitute a "sale" of securities under section 25017(a), and under
what circumstances does an existing company's election or termina-
tion of close corporation status constitute a sale of securities under
section 25017(a)?
a. "Shareholders'Agreements" and Other Shareholder Ar-
rangements as a Sale
Since the enactment of the Corporate Securities Law of 1968, the
Department of Corporations has consistently accepted the position
273a. Harwyn Industries had repeatedly taken advantage of a loophole in the
Securities Act of 1933 to convert different subsidiaries into publicly held
companies. On each occasion, Harwyn had "spun off" the subsidiary's shares to
Harwyn's shareholders. "Putting aside . . . the technical niceties and precise
language of the 1933 Act," 326 F. Supp. 943, 952, the court held that the parent
corporation violated § 5 by failing to register the "spin-offs." SEC v. Harwyn
Indus. Corp., 326 F. Supp. 943 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH
SEcURrrIES REGULATION-CASES AND MATERIALS 454 (4th ed. 1977). Cf. SEC
Securities Act Release No. 4982 (July 2, 1969) (discussing "spin-offs").
274. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(h)(5) (West Supp. 1976); Rule 260.102.8, 10 CAL.
ADMIN. CODE § 260.102.8 (1978); 1 H. MARSH & R. VOLK, supra note 63, § 4.02[13].
275. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25120 (West Supp. 1976); Release 50-C, supra note 253,
at 3; 1 H. MARSH & R. VOLK, supra note 63, § 7.03. See also Wesiern Airlines, Inc.
v. Sobieski, 191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 414, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719, 728 (1961).
that shareholder contracts which "change the rights, preferences,
privileges, or restrictions of or on outstanding securities, without
affecting the charter documents of the corporation, are not subject to
the qualification requirements of the Corporate Securities Law." '276
The Commissioner announced in March, 1977, that he was modifying
this traditional position in light of section 204 of the new General
Corporation Law, which allows certain provisions to be included in
"shareholders' agreements" rather than in the articles.2 77
In May, 1978, the Department adopted the following rule:
260.017.2. Changes Effected Through Shareholders' Agreements.
The term "any change in the rights, preferences, privileges, or restric-
tions of or on outstanding securities" as used in Subdivision (a) of
Section 25017 of the Code includes changes in the rights, preferences,
privileges, or restrictions of or on outstanding securities of a corpora-
tion effected through the adoption, modification or termination of
provisions of a shareholders' agreement, which provisions, except for
the second gentence of Section 204(a) or other provision of the Code, or
a substantially similar provision of the law of a foreign jurisdiction,
would be required to be in the articles of incorporation or bylaws to be
effective.
278
The modification or termination of a "shareholders' agreement"
described by the rule includes an involuntary modification or termi-
nation resulting from cessation of close corporation status, whether
voluntary or involuntary. 7 8a A.B. 2 5 1 0 ,278b presently pending in the
legislature, would amend the Securities Law to provide an exemp-
tion from qualification for the termination of a "shareholders' agree-
ment" pursuant to section 300(b)Y
8c
The February, 1977 version of Rule 260.017.2 included within the
definition of "sale" any change in the rights of the securities of any
corporation (close or non-close) effected through the execution, mod-
ification, or termination of any "shareholders' agreement," voting
agreement, or irrevocable proxy. The finally adopted version covers
276. CORP. SEC. NEWSLETTER, June, 1976, at 5. Accord, CoRP SEC. NEWS-
LETTER, March, 1977, at 11; ESCROW NEWSLETTER, June, 1977 at 3; Dep't of Corpo-
rations, State of California, Commissioner's Opinions No. 71/105C, 73/72C,
73/73C, & 73/74C. See Wang, supra note **, at 1173 n.5 Cf. Jordan, supra note 28,
at 1136 ("[Voting agreements not taking the form of voting trusts would not be
subject to regulation under the Securities Law.").
After A.B. 376 (the new General Corporation Law) was introduced, it was at
one point amended to provide for regulation of voting agreements under the
Securities Law, but this language was subsequently deleted. Jordan, supra at
1136-38.
A majority of the State Bar Committee which drafted the new General Corpo-
ration Law concluded that the Corporations Commissioner's jurisdiction
should not extend to § 706(a) pooling agreements. McKenzie, supra note 6, at 496,
277. CORP. SEC. NEWSLETTER, March, 1977, at 11.
278. Rule 260.017.2 (May 12, 1978) (on file with the San Diego Law Review).
278a. Release 55-C, supra note 244a, at 3.
278b. A.B. 2510, § 18, amending CAL. CORP. CODE § 25103(e) (West Supp. 1976)
(on file with the San Diego Law Review). See note 98a supra. See text accom-
panying note 290b infra.
278c. See text accompanying note 85 supra.
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close corporations only and deliberately omits reference to voting
agreements or irrevocable proxies. As noted in his May, 1978 Release,
the Commissioner has decided not to treat the execution of pooling
agreements and irrevocable proxies as section 25017(a) "sales.
' 27 9
The ironic result is that, apparently, the shareholders of both close
and non-close corporations can use either section 706(a) or non-
section 706(a) pooling agreements (containing irrevocable proxies)
280
or voting trusts (with five or fewer beneficiaries) 2 1 to reallocate
control without having to worry about qualification, while the same
provisions in a close corporation "shareholders' agreement" might
well require qualification. As mentioned earlier,2 82 if one clause of a
"shareholders' agreement" resembles a pooling agreement, the Gen-
eral Corporation Law may treat that clause as a section 706(a) pooling
agreement completely separate from the "shareholders' agreement."
Because the Commissioner has defined a "shareholders' agreement"
as a "charter document,"28 3 it is unclear whether he would take such
a charitable view toward pooling agreement clauses in "sharehold-
ers' agreements," although the courts might force such a position
upon him.
In any event, under the new rules, the insertion of voting provisions
279. Release 55-C, supra note 244a, at 2-3.
280. See generally McKenzie, supra note 6, at 468; Wang, note ** supra.
Under § 705(e), a bare proxy stated to be irrevocable may still be revocable
unless "it is given to secure the performance of a duty." CAL. CORP. CODE § 705(e)
(West Supp. 1976). But see Berger, supra note 59, at 593-95. Nevertheless, an
irrevocable proxy contained a pooling agreement is irrevocable under § 705(e)
because it is given to secure the performance of a contractual obligation to vote
in a certain manner. See Wang, supra at 1181-85 and authorities cited therein.
Because of the questionable validity of bare irrevocable proxies, the remainder
of the discussion will emphasize voting trusts and pooling agreements.
281. An interest or certificate in a voting trust is a security under the Califor-
nia Securities Law. See notes 63 & 80 supra. Section 25102(f) of the Corpora-
tions Code exempts from § 25110 any offer or sale of a voting trust interest if,
after the "sale," the interests are held by no more than five individuals (§ 25110
requires the qualification of "issuer transaction" offers and sales). CAL. CORP.
CODE § 25102(f) (West Supp. 1976). Thus, under certain circumstances, the "issu-
ance" of voting trust interests need not be qualified.
However, § 25102(f) creates an exemption only from § 25110 and not from §
25120, the latter requiring the qualification of "issuer transactions" (transac-
tions for the issuer's benefit) involving changes in the rights of outstanding
securities. (Under § 25120, the "issuer" involved would be the corporation and
not the trust.). Thus, the question whether the creation of a voting trust is a §
25017(a) "sale" is separate from the issue whether voting trust interests (which
are themselves securities) must be qualified.
282. See text accompanying notes 129-31 & 135 supra.
283. See text accompanying notes 240-41 supra.
into a close corporation "shareholders' agreement" is a trap for
the unwary. When liquidation or dividend preferences are not de-
sired, close corporation shareholders would be well-advised to avoid
"shareholders' agreements" entirely by allocating economic interests
through the number of shares and reallocating voting interests
through voting trusts (with less than five beneficiaries) or pooling
agreements containing irrevocable proxies. Indeed, if shareholders of
a close corporation wish to make their reallocation of voting power
self-executing, a voting trust or section 706(a) pooling agreement
would have a slight advantage over voting provisions in a "share-
holders' agreement.
'284
Another anomalous result of the Commissioner's rules is that a
group of ten or fewer individuals could organize a corporation,
utilize the section 25102(h) exemption, and after a "suitable" time
interval, execute a voting trust (with five or fewer beneficiaries),
a pooling agreement, or irrevocable proxies without notifying the
Department of Corporations. As long as the voting agreements were
not "intended to be executed" at the time the small offering exemp-
tion was utilized,285 there would be no violation of the California
Securities Law.
Under the new securities rules, it is uncertain whether a unani-
mous contract among close corporation shareholders will sometimes
be considered a "shareholders' agreement" even though the contract
is not labeled a "shareholders' agreement" or expressly states that it
is not a "shareholders' agreement." Assuming that a unanimous
shareholder contract abridging board discretion is valid under the
common law,281a close corporation shareholders might conceivably
try to opt out of sections 300(b) and 186 and thereby avoid qual-
ification.2S5b Other firms might choose to eliminate the entire prob-
lem simply by avoiding close corporation status.
Even if the execution, modification, or termination of a "share-
holders' agreement" were submitted for a permit, it is uncertain what
standards the Department should apply. Sections 25110 and 25120 of
the Code require the qualification of different types of "issuer trans-
actions," while section 25130 requires the qualification of "non-
issuer transactions." It is not clear whether "shareholders' agree-
ment" transactions are "issuer" or "non-issuer" transactions (or
284. Proxies under a § 706(a) pooling agreement are expressly permitted to be
irrevocable under § 705(e). See Wang, supra note **, at 1181-85. Proxies in § 186
"shareholders' agreements" are not expressly mentioned in § 705(e), although
the general language of that provision ("to secure the performance of a duty")
would permit proxies in a "shareholders' agreement" to be irrevocable. See
Id.
285. See text accompanying note 255 supra.
285a. See notes 116 -19 and accompanying text supra.
285b. See text accompanying notes 160-61 supra.
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both). "Non-issuer transactions" are defined as transactions "not
directly or indirectly for the benefit of the issuer. ' 286 Although the
statute does not define the term "issuer transaction," the clear impli-
cation is that any transaction for the direct or indirect benefit of the
issuer is an "issuer transaction. '287 A reallocation of the control and
the profits of a corporation is for the benefit of the owners and not
for the benefit of the company itself. It could therefore be argued that
a change in the rights of outstanding securities resulting from a
"shareholders' agreement" is a "non-issuer transaction" covered by
section 25130. Both the Commissioner and the leading commen-
tators, however, seem to assume that all section 25017(a) changes in
rights are "issuer transactions.
'288
If the execution of a "shareholders' agreement" were a non-issuer
transaction, it might still be exempt from qualification under section
25104, which creates exemptions from section 25130. However, none
of the subdivisions of section 25104 seem to apply to changes in
shareholder rights. In all likelihood, the legislature never contem-
plated the problem of "non-issuer" changes in shareholder rights. If,
as is almost universally assumed,289 all section 25017(a) changes in
the rights of securities are always "issuer transactions," section
25103(e) would be the only applicable exemption provision. This
section deals with "issuer transactions" and exempts from sections
25110 and 25120 all changes in the rights, preferences, privileges, or
restrictions of or on outstanding shares, except those which (1) mate-
rially and adversely affect any class of shareholders and (2) are
mentioned in a specific list of types of changes.2 90 Included in the list
286. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25011 (West Supp. 1976). See id. § 25010. See generally
2 H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, supra note 1, § 456.01; 1 H. MARSH & R. VOLK,
supra note 63, § 10.03[2].
287. 1 H. MARSH & R. VOLK, supra note 63, § 10.03[2) (1976).
288. See Release 50-C, supra note 253, at 3; 2 H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING,
supra note 1, § 454.05[1][a], [b]; 1 H. MARSH & R. VOLK, supra note 63, § 7.05, at 7-
27. Proposed Rule 260.05.24(b) (Sept. 14, 1977) refers to changes in shareholder
rights "not otherwise exempted from qualification under section 25120 of the
Code." Section 25130 is not mentioned. As will be discussed shortly, § 25103(e)
creates exemptions to "issuer transactions" required to be qualified under §
25110 and § 25120. Both the Department of Corporations and the commentators
seem to assume that § 25103(e) (dealing with "issuer transactions") is the only
exemption available to § 25017(a) changes in rights. See CORP. SEC. NEWSLETTER,
March, 1977, at 11; 1 H. MARsH & R. VOLK, supra § 7.03; McKenzie, supra note 6,
at 487. But see Release 55-C, supra note 244a, at 2: "The exemption most
pertinent ... [to § 25017(a)] is Section 25103(e)" (emphasis added).
289. See authorities cited note 288 supra.
290. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25103(e) (West Supp. 1976); 2 H. BALLANTINE & G.
STERLING, supra note 1, § 454.05[1][a],[b]; 1 H. MARSH & R. VOLK, supra note 63, §
are changes in dividend, liquidation, and voting rights. This provi-
sion strongly suggests that the legislature considered all such
changes to be "issuer transactions" even though it might be difficult
in some cases to find a direct or indirect benefit to the issuer. The
language of A.B. 2510290a lends support to this interpretation. The bill
amends section 25103(e) to provide an issuer transaction exemption
for the termination of a "shareholders' agreement. ' '290b If, as virtually
everyone assumes, 291 the section 25103(e) exemption is available to
"shareholders' agreements," many close corporation "shareholders'
agreements" might be exempt from qualification because they do not
"materially and adversely affect any class of shareholders ' 29 2 but
instead benefit some shareholders and adversely affect others with
no adverse effect on the entire class.
During the discussion of the small offering exemption, this article
hypothesized a "shareholders' agreement" which retained the board
of directors but shifted all power away from the board to a "Manag-
ing Shareholder" with an indefinite term.293 The Commissioner
might take two possible views: (1) The agreement diminishes the
effective voting power of all shares; or (2) the agreement diminishes
the effective voting power of all shares except those of the "Manag-
ing Shareholder. '294 Under either approach, the execution of the
agreement might be exempt from qualification.
If the Commissioner takes the first view, there is a material adverse
effect on the entire class of shareholders, but not a disproportionate
effect. Therefore, the hypothetical "shareholders' agreement" would
not be exempt under section 25103(e). However, the agreement might
not create a second class of stock for purposes of the section 25102(h)
small offering exemption.294a If, in addition, no "non-voting" stock is
created,294b such an agreement might be outside the Commissioner's
jurisdiction if adopted on initial organization. Rule 260.103 exempts
[a]ny change in the rights, preferences, privileges, or restrictions of or
on outstanding securities. . . if the transaction, had it involved the
issuance of a new security containing the changed rights, preferences,
privileges, or restrictions ... would have been exempt from ... sec-
tion 25110 [requiring the qualification of issuer securities sales] by any
7.03. See also discussion of share transfer restrictions in text accompanying
notes 157-58 supra.
290a. See authorities cited note 278b and accompanying text supra.
290b. A.B. 2510, § 18, amending CAL. CORP. CODE § 25103(e) (West Supp. 1976)
(on file with the San Diego Law Review).
291. See authorities cited note 288 supra.
292. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25103(e) (West Supp. 1976) (emphasis added).
293. See text accompanying note 259 supra.
294. See notes 255-59 and accompanying text supra.
294a. Id.
294b. See authorities cited notes 260-62 and accompanying text supra.
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of the subdivisions of section 25102 [including section 25102(h)]. 294c
Therefore, the vagueness of the Department's standards-for the small
offering exemption creates additional uncertainty as to when the
execution of a "shareholders' agreement" must be qualified. Because
the Commissioner has given no guidelines as to when a "sharehold-
ers' agreement" creates "non-voting" stock disqualifying an issuer
from the section 25102(h) exemption294d and has not given a clear
indication of when a "shareholders' agreement" creates a disqualify-
ing second class of stock,294e it is difficult to know when the execu-
tion of a "shareholders' agreement" is exempt under Rule 260.103.
Two possible views of the hypothetical "shareholders' agreement"
were mentioned earlier. If the Commissioner takes the second ap-
proach, there is arguably no material adverse effect on a "class" of
stock. Such an agreement would make a newly organized company
ineligible for the small offering exemption 294 f but would not require
qualification if adopted by the shareholders of an existing
company.294 g Under the second view, most "shareholders' agree-
ments" would not adversely affect an entire class of securities and
would therefore be exempt from qualification. Regardless of which
position the Commissioner takes, the results are anomalous.
Unfortunately, there appears to be virtually no discussion of the
meaning of "class" in section 25103(e). 29 The Commissioner would
probably take the view that two or more shareholders constitute a
"class." Indeed, the Department may even be forced to maintain that
the term "shareholder" means a "class" of shareholders. 296 Other-
294c. Rule 260.103, 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 260.103 (1978). See Release 55-C,
supra note 244a, at 5; 1 H. MARSH & R. VOLK, supra note 63, § 7.05. Although the
text of Rule 260.103 states that it is adopted pursuant to § 25103 of the Code
(dealing with exemptions from qualification of recapitalizations and reorgani-
zations), the language of the rule is not limited to recapitalizations and reorgani-
zations and has a broad impact. The official note following the rule cites as
authority § 25105, which gives the Commissioner broad general exemptive pow-
er (see note 304 infra); and Marsh and Volk state that the rule is adopted
pursuant to § 25105. of the Code. 1 H. MARSH & R. VOLK, supra.
294d. See authorities cited note 262 and accompanying text supra.
294e. See notes 253-57 and accompanying text supra.
294f. See notes 255-59 and accompanying text supra.
294g. See text accompanying note 290 supra.
295. See, e.g., 1 H. MARSH & R. VOLK, supra note 63, § 703[3], which analyzes §
25103(e) but contains no discussion of the meaning of "class."
296. On January 6, 1972, the Commissioner gave an opinion that a set of
articles and by-laws amendments changing a corporation from professional to
non-professional status was exempt under § 25103(e) "because since B is the sole
shareholder... ,they [the amendments] do not substantially or adversely affect
wise, there would be no need to qualify a "shareholders' agreement"
which materially and adversely affected the rights of only one share-
holder of a two-shareholder corporation.
b. Conversion to or from Close Corporation Status as a
Sale
When an existing corporation amends its articles to elect or termi-
nate close corporation status, it either creates or eliminates the statu-
tory share restrictions and rights discussed at the beginning of this
article.297 Such conversions may therefore be a "sale" under section
25017(a). Under the Commissioner's rules,298 section 25017(a) encom-
passes the addition to, or deletion from, the articles of incorporation
of the provisions prescribed by section 158(a) for all close corpora-
tions.
299
The February and September 1977 proposed regulations included a
rule300 which would have exempted certain changes in rights ac-
companying the termination or election of close corporation status.
That rule has not been adopted 3 1 in light of the likely passage of A.B.
2510,302 which exempts from qualification any change in shareholder
rights resulting from the addition or deletion of the articles provi-
sions required of close corporations. In other words, the pending bill
would exempt any change in shareholder rights resulting solely from
the election or the voluntary or involuntary termination of close
corporation status.
30 3
4. Summary of the Corporations Commissioner's Rules Relat-
ing to Close Corporations
Under the Commissioner's rules relating to close corporations,
"shareholders' agreements" are defined as "charter documents" and
treated much the same as articles provisions are presently treated. A
"shareholders' agreement"
any class of shareholders." Dep't of Corporations, State of California, Commis-
sioner's Opinion Op. L. 206, at 3 (Jan. 6, 1972) (emphasis added) (on file with the
San Diego Law Review). Whatever the underlying rationale, the stated basis of
the opinion appears to be that a single shareholder is not a "class" of sharehold-
ers for the purpose of § 25103(e).
297. See Release 55-C, supra note 244a, at 3; Release 50-C, supra note 253, at
3-4.
298. Rule 260.017.3 (May 12, 1978) (on file with the San Diego Law Review).
See Release 55-C, supra note 244a, at 3.
299. See notes 8-9 and accompanying text supra.
300. Proposed Rule 260.105.24 (Feb. 9, 1977 and Sept. 14,1977) (on file with the
San Diego Law Review).
301. Release 55-C, supra note 244a, at 5.
302. A.B. 2510 § 18, amending CAL. CoRP. CODE § 25103(e) (West Supp. 1976).
See note 98a supra.
303. A.B. 2510 would also exempt the termination of a "shareholders' agree-
ment" pursuant to § 300(b). See text accompanying notes278-278c supra.
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(a) must be disclosed in permit applications;
(b) creates a second class of stock making the corpora-
tion ineligible for the section 25102(h) exemption if the
agreement alters shareholder rights in a non-uniform
manner;
(c) under certain circumstances might create "non-vot-
ing" stock disqualifying an issuer from the section 25102(h)
exemption; and
(d) is itself a "sale" of securities under section 25017(a) if
the agreement changes the rights of shareholders, unless an
exemption under section 25103(e) or Rule 260.103 is avail-
able.
Pooling agreements, voting trusts, and other such arrangements
are not treated as section 25017(a) "sales," but the Commissioner has
warned that they may create a second class of stock making the
corporation ineligible for the section 25102(h) exemption. Further-
more, the Department now requires that such voting agreements be
disclosed on the form notifying the Commissioner of the use of the
exemption. Unfortunately, the Department has provided no rules on
pooling agreements or other such arrangements to guide the attorney
who must sign the opinion that the section 25102(h) exemption is
available.
Under a rule adopted by the Commissioner, changes in shareholder
rights resulting from the election or termination of close corporation
status would be treated as a section 25017(a) "sale"; but pending
legislation (A.B. 2510) would grant a statutory exemption to any
changes in shareholder rights resulting solely from conversion to or
from close corporation status.
In light of the new rules, it is unwise to insert voting provisions in a
"shareholders' agreement." The best device for reallocating control is
a voting trust with five or fewer beneficiaries. The next best alterna-
tive would be a section 706(a) pooling agreement. In light of both
federal tax law and the California Securites Law, whenever possible
a corporation should issue stock in proportion to the economic par-
ticipation desired (without any reallocation of distributions) and, if
necessary, use a voting trust or pooling agreement to differentiate the
pattern of control from that of economic ownership. This approach
should avoid problems under section 25017(a) and minimize (al-
though not eliminate) problems under section 25102(h).
5. Recommended Changes in the Securities Rules and Statutes
Which Affect the Close Corporation
As just noted, there are a number of anomalies and ambiguities in
the securities rules the Commissioner has adopted in an attempt to
reconcile the Securities Law with the close corporation provisions of
the hew General Corporation Law. There are three approaches to
solving some of these problems: (a) distinguishing between the reallo-
cation of voting power and of corporate distributions; (b) creating a
California private offering exemption by statute or through the
Commissioner's exempting authority under section 25105;304 and (c)
providing across-the-board exemptions (by statute or rule) from sec-
tions 25102(h) and 25017(a) for "shareholders' agreements" and
other contracts among close corporation shareholders.
a. Distinguishing Between Reallocation of Voting Power
and of Corporate Distributions
As mentioned earlier, a corporation electing Subchapter S status is
permitted only one class of stock. The federal courts, the Internal
Revenue Service, and, to some extent, the Internal Revenue Code have
adopted the position that reallocations of voting power through vot-
ing trusts and pooling agreements do not create a second class of
stock.
The Corporations Commissioner could adopt rules which take a
similar approach. Pooling agreements, voting trusts, irrevocable
proxies, and voting provisions of "shareholders' agreements" would
not be considered changes in shareholder rights for the purposes of
section 25017(a) and would not affect the availability of the section
25102(h) small offering exemption.
Even if the Commissioner rejects this approach, he should clarify
his views on voting trusts, pooling agreements, and irrevocable
proxies.
b. Creating a California Private Offering Exemption
The rules proposed by the Commissioner in February, 1977,
contained a "discussion draft" of a proposed rule which would create
a kind of private offering exemption under the California Securities
Law. °7 The proposal closely tracked section 25102(h) with both re-
304. Section 25105 permits the Commissioner to exempt transactions from §§
25110, 25120, and 25130 (the provisions requiring qualification) if he finds the
qualification requirement "as not being comprehended within the purposes of
this law" and "not necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors."
305. Note 305 has been omitted.
306. Note 306 has been omitted.
307. Proposed Rule 260.105.- [sic] (Feb. 9, 1977) (on file with the San Diego
Law Review). See Release 50-C, supra note 253, at 7-10.
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strictive and liberalizing additions. The more restrictive provisions
included a requirement that specific disclosures be made and that
participating investors be limited to persons who might be assumed
not to require the protection of the qualification provisions because
of financial sophistication, future employment by the issuer in a
management capacity, and other such factors. The liberalizing provi-
sion made an issuer eligible for the section 25102(h) exemption de-
spite the existence of "shareholders' agreements," pooling agree-
ments, and irrevocable proxies.
The September, 1977 version of the proposed rules did not include
the proposed "private offering" exemption "due to the present lack
of regulatory experience. . . and the lack of substantive comment,"
although the Commissioner said that the proposal might be recon-
sidered at a later date.30 8 The finally adopted regulations also did not
include the exemption proposed in February, 1977. Admittedly, it is
difficult to define those investors whose sophistication or connection
with the issuer is sufficient to enable them to protect themselves.
Nevertheless, the Commissioner should adopt or at least recommend
an exemptive rule or statutory provision which defines a "private
placement" and provides that, in such a situation, "shareholders'
agreements" and other contracts among close corporation sharehold-
ers neither constitute section 25017(a) "sales" nor prevent the use of
the small offering exemption.3 0 9 In drafting the rule or statutory
amendment, the Commissioner could rely on the substantial federal
experience in defining "private placement" or could conceivably
adopt Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 146 verbatim.
31 0
308. Dep't of Corporations Release 52-C, at 2 (Sept. 14, 1977) (on file with the
San Diego Law Review).
309. Anthony R. Pierno (a former Commissioner) has also expressed regret
that the Department put aside the "private offering" exemption proposed in
February, 1977. Bus. L. NEWS, Winter, 1977, at 6.
For a general discussion of private offering exemptions under state securities
law, see Annot., 84 A.L.R.3d 1009 (1978).
310. Section 4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(d)(2) (1970),
creates a private offering exemption, which has been "codified" in SEC Rule
146, 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1976). See 3 H. BLOOMENTHAL; SECURITIES AND FEDERAL
CORPORATE LAW § 6.01 (1977); 2 & 2A S. GOLDBERG, PRIVATE PLACEMENTS AND
RESTRICTED SECURITIES (1975); R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULA-
TIONS-CASES AND MATERIALS 328-80 (4th ed. 1977); D. RATNER, SECURITIES REGU-
LATION-MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE 221-48 (1975); 11 H. SOWARDS, FEDERAL
SECURITIES ACT § 4.02[1] (1977); Casey, SEC Rules 144 and 146 Revisited, 43
BROOKLYN L. REV. 571 (1977). For a discussion of the leading cases interpreting §
4(2), see generally Doran v. Petroleum Management Corp., 545 F.2d 892 (5th Cir.
1977), noted in 9 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 343 (1977); 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 618 (1977). For
c. Across-the-Board Exemptions from Sections 25102(h)
and 25017(a) for "Shareholders' Agreements" and Other
Contracts Among Shareholders of a Close Corporation
The Corporations Commissioner has acknowledged that the pur-
pose of the close corporation provisions of the new General Corpora-
tion Law is to provide flexibility to close corporation investors.
311 If
the new devices created by the new law, such as the close corporation
"shareholders' agreement" and the section 706(a) pooling agreement,
precipitate qualification or must themselves be qualified, a great
deal of flexibility will be lost. Through "shareholders' agreements,"
close corporation shareholders can deprive themselves of much of the
protection provided by the General Corporation Law.312 There seems
no reason why close corporation associates should not be able to
deprive themselves of the protection of the Securities Law as well.
313
d. Paternalism Versus Non-Paternalism
The three above-mentioned approaches are not mutually exclusive.
In fact, even if statutory close corporations were largely exempted
from the Securities Code, there would remain the problem of non-
close corporation pooling agreements, voting trusts, and irrevocable
proxies, none of which would require or precipitate qualification
under the first approach discussed above.
further discussion of Doran, see Castruccio & Hentrich, Developments in Fed-
eral Securities Regulation-1977, 33 Bus. LAW. 1645, 1654-57 (1978). See also
Cook v. Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d 685, 691 (1st Cir. 1978).
Rule 146 has recently been amended to require the filing of a form with the
SEC in connection with the use of the rule. No report need be filed for any
offering or offerings the proceeds of which total, cumulatively, less than $50,000
during any 12-month period. SEC Release No. 33-5912 (Mar. 3, 1978), reprinted
in SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) H-1 (Mar. 8, 1978), FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81.524.
The SEC has also recently.proposed significant amendments to Rule 146. SEC
Release No. 33-5913 (Mar. 6, 1978), reprinted in (current] FED. SEC. L. REP (CCH)
81,532. The proposed amendments are reproduced in 1 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
q 2709 (1978).
In addition to relying on the federal experience, the Commissioner could draw
on his own experience in administering California Code §§ 25102(a) (exempting
non-public issuer offers of any security under certain conditions); 25102(e), (f)
(g) (exempting non-public issuer offers or sales of debt securities, partnership
interests, and collateral trusts); and 25104(a) (exempting non-public non-issuer
offers or sales under certain conditions). See also 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §§
260.102.1-.2 (1978).
311. Release 50-C, supra note 253, at 8; CORP. SEC. NEWSLETTER, March, 1977,
at 9.
312. CAL. CORP. CODE § 300(c) (West Supp. 1976). See text accompanying notes
95-108 supra.
313. This article does not address the relatively minor problem of how to
treat a close corporation with more than 10 shareholders for the purposes of §
25102(h) (but with 10 or fewer shareholders for the purposes of § 158). See
generally note 250 and authorities cited note 252 supra.
[VOL. 15: 687, 1978] Statutory Close Corporations
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
The solution one chooses depends in large part on how paternalis-
tic one feels the government should be. As administered by the De-
partment of Corporations, the California Securities Law remains
extremely paternalistic. Investors are protected from themselves by a
bureaucratic standard of fairness. Furthermore, the enactment of the
new law seems to have triggered securities rules which actually
decrease flexibility. Until the new statute became effective at the
beginning of 1977, contractual arrangements among shareholders
had received benign neglect from the Department of Corporations.
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Indeed, utilizing broad-sweeping language, the Commissioner ruled
in 1973 that a voting trust did not create a second class of stock for
the purposes of section 25102(h).31 5 Now, the Commissioner has
stated that pooling agreements and other such voting arrangements
may make an issuer ineligible for the small offering exemption.
316
I have always found it remarkable that the state is so solicitous
toward securities investors, who constitute only a small fraction of
the population-and the most affluent part at that. For the over-
whelming majority of Californians, the largest and most important
purchases are automobiles and homes rather than securities (and
certainly not securities requiring qualification by permit). Yet there
is no Department of Home and Automobile Purchases to ensure that
buyers avoid transactions which are unfair, unjust, or inequitable. Of
course, the counterargument is that there is a much greater potential
for unfairness in securities sales than in the sale of homes or cars; but
I suspect that for every victim of securities fraud, there are a hundred
people (mostly poor) who have been cheated in used car transactions.
The processing of securities permit applications imposes costs on
both the taxpayer and the investor. The benefits of preventing all
exploitation of corporate shareholders should be weighed against its
costs. Because of the small number of shareholders, there seems little
potential for abuse in the close corporation context. Because I feel
there should be limits to what the government should do to protect its
residents from their own folly, I strongly support a non-paternalistic
approach toward the shareholders of statutory close corporations.
Although some investors would undoubtedly make mistakes, all close
corporation associates would be able to take advantage of the provi-
sions of the new General Corporation Law without the necessity of
obtaining the approval of the Corporations Commissioner.
314. See note 276 and accompanying text supra.
315. See authorities cited notes 268-69 and accompanying text supra.
316. See notes 253, 262, 265-67a, & 269 and accompanying text supra.
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The new General Corporation Law makes two devices available to
the statutory close corporation: the section 300(b) "shareholders'
agreement" and the section 706(a) pooling agreement.
Corporations with a small number of shareholders often wish to
allocate control separately from financial interest.318 To minimize
federal tax and California Securities Law problems, a close corpora-
tion should use a pooling agreement (or voting trust with five or
fewer beneficiaries) 319 to accomplish this objective and should avoid
the use of a "shareholders' agreement." Indeed, the insertion of vot-
ing provisions in a "shareholders' agreement" is a trap for the un-
wary. A pooling agreement (or a voting trust) does not make a corpo-
ration ineligible for Subchapter S and would not be treated as a
section 25017(a) "sale" under the Corporations Commissioner's re-
cently adopted rules. Lamentably, the Commissioner has taken the
position that a pooling agreement or other such arrangement will
sometimes disqualify a corporation from the section 25102(h) exemp-
tion, although the Department has thus far not proposed any
guidelines in this area.
The voting trust is available to close and non-close corporation
shareholders alike,3 20 but the common law validity of a non-close
corporation pooling agreement is unclear. 321 Of course, neither a
voting trust nor a pooling agreement would create the procedural
flexibility attainable through a "shareholders' agreement." A
"shareholders' agreement" can reallocate corporate distributions,
abridge board discretion, or even shift most power away from the
board 322 and the shareholders to a single "Managing Shareholder"
317. See summaries in text accompanying notes 80-81, 162, 234-35, & 303-04
supra. See also ORGANIZING, supra note 10, at 66-67.
318. See 1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 6, §§ 3.12-.17, 5.02; W. PAINTER, PROBLEMS
AND MATERIALS IN BUSINESS PLANNING 21 (1975).
319. Voting trusts with more than five beneficiaries must normally be qual-
ified with the Department of Corporations. See notes 63 & 244 supra.
320. CAL. CORP. CODE § 706(b) (West Supp. 1976). See notes 59-66 and accom-
panying text supra.
321. See text accompanying notes 45-80 supra.
I have argued elsewhere that the statute should eliminate the uncertainty
surrounding non-close corporation pooling agreements and make it clear that
such agreements are valid and specifically enforceable and can make use of
irrevocable proxies. Wang, supra note **, at 1187-88. For a similar recom-
mendation, see Siegel, Book Review, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 914, 922 (1977).
At my suggestion, on March 7, 1978, the Legislation Committee of the San
Diego County Bar Association recommended that the Board of Governors of
the State Bar of California sponsor legislation to amend § 706(a) in essentially
the manner urged in my 1976 article. See note 58 supra.
322. For a discussion of the distinction between abridging board discretion
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who would run the corporation almost like a sole proprietorship,
323
thereby minimizing procedural red tape and decreasing legal ex-
penses. Although this latter advantage will not be greeted with en-
thusiasm by attorneys, they still have a fiduciary obligation to advise
their clients of their options under the new statute.
Unfortunately, a reallocation of corporate distributions would dis-
qualify a corporation from Subchapter S status and create other
federal tax complications. Furthermore, under rules adopted by the
California Corporations Commissioner, a "shareholders' agreement"
may create non-voting stock or a second class of stock making the
corporation ineligible for the section 25102(h) exemption. Moreover,
any "shareholders' agreement" altering shareholder rights would
require a permit unless exempt under section 25103(e) or Rule
260.103. The regulations adopted by the California Department of
Corporations have greatly diminished the utility of the "sharehold-
ers' agreement." A company may even decide to forego close corpora-
tion status entirely in order to escape the risk of having all its
unanimous shareholder contracts classed as statutory "shareholders'
agreements." It is ironic that the new securities rules may often
transform the "shareholders' agreement" from a blessing to be
sought into a curse to be avoided.
and shifting power away from the board, see text accompanying notes 140-41
supra.
323. See 2 FoRMs, supra note 67, forms 8.81, .82. See also authorities cited
note 141 and accompanying text supra.

